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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WAYNE S. TIPPETT, ) ADDENDUM TO BRIEF 
) OF APPELLANT 
Appellant, ) 
) Case # 990178-CA 
v. ) 
FRED VANDERVEUR, ) 
Appellee. ) 
ADDENDUM EXHIBIT A 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WAYNE S TEPPETT, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
RULING 
Case No 970800314 RN 
FRED VANDERVEUR, 
Respondent. 
Judge John R. Anderson 
The Court has carefully read the memoranda regarding Tippett's Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief. 
The petition is denied for the reasons set forth in the Respondent's memorandum. 
DATED this day of February, 1999 
Judge John R. Anderson 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that on this / day of February, 1999,1 hand-delivered or mailed, 
postage prepaid, the foregoing Ruling to the following Angela F Micidos, Assistant Attorney 
General, P 0 Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, Joann Stringham, Uintah County 
Attorney, 152 East 100 North, Vernal, Utah 84078, and to Julie McPherson, Attorney for the 
Petitioner, 321 South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Deputy Court Clerk 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WAYNES/IIPPFI I, 
Appcll.int 
v. 
FRED\ \NI)I PVIUR 
Appellee. 
) ADDENDUM 1 0 BRIEF 
) OFAPPFIIANT 
) I JSC/J (»M()I ,V< A 
ADDENDUM EXHIBIT B 
1 done. If I am going to make a trip to Gunnison, I am 
effectively going to wipe out one full day of work 
regardless. Four hours there, four hours back. Visit 
^ n g - ^ y w j i e r ^ 
7 
8 
9 
.0 
— • — - — • > 
remember particularly how long these were. But it was 
easy to say, okay. If I am going to wipe out the 
whole day at work, I am going to go to Gunnison, then 
I can keep on going, spend the night and talk to 
relatives. My in-laws live m Fillmore, whicn is 
11 another 80, 90 miles past Gunnison. 
12 Q And do you believe you could have raised any 
13 other issue more effectively, or a little more 
effectively helped him on petition for rehearing if 
you had gone out and visited him with a copy of the 
appellate decision in hand versus instructing his 
17 secretary to mail it to him? 
18 A I'm not sure that it would have made any 
19 difference on my effectiveness on petition for 
20 rehearing. Again, as I said, I sent him a copy of the 
21 opinion. Told him that we could be doing certificate. 
22 That it was not clear to me based on law whether my 
23 representation went that far, to please advise me what 
24 he wanted to do. 
25 Q Were you ever advised prior to the appellate 
14 
15 
16 
93 
IM Mil IM \HCOURI 1)1 \PPI \l b 
WAYNE S. TIPPETT, ) ADDENDUM 10 BRIEF 
) OFAPPEILANT 
Appell ml I 
) I ase// W0I7S CA 
v. ) 
I Kl h i \NI>I l'\ I MfJ ) 
Appellee. ) 
\DDhNDUM EXHIBIT C 
office. Probably six or seven times. And then I 
talked to him about three times, three or four times 
on the phone. 
Q When he would call during the six or seven 
times when you were not available to talk to him, were 
his calls accepted by your secretary? 
A Probably not. 
Q Did you ever send Mr. Tippett letters 
explaining to him why you felt some of his issues were 
frivolous or not timely or not right for review based 
on current case law? 
A I never told him any of his issues were 
frivolous. 
Q Did you ever tell him any --
A I did not explain in the letters to him those 
things because I had explained them to him in the 
visits that where I considered they were proper in the 
context of what we were dealing with at that time. 
Q And when did you send Mr. Tippett a copy of 
your brief-fcLlgd in Utah Supreme Courti 
A I did not personally do it. I directed my 
secretary to do it within the week, within a week or 
so after it was filed. 
Q Did you ever tell Mr. Tippett that you would 
send him a copy of the draft of the brief for his 
79 
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
WAYNE S. TIPPETT, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
it 
* 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 94-0369 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Section 78-2-3 (i). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 
Appellant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea? 
The court should review this case using an ,f abuse of 
discretion" standard, State vs. Mildenhall. 747 P.2d 
422, (Utah 1987) . 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
This case is governed in part by Rule 11(e), Utah Rujes of 
Criminal Procedure, which was at the time of the plea codified as 
Title 77, Chapter, 35, Section 11(e), Utah Code Annotated. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal of the Eighth District Court's denial of
 a 
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea submitted by the defendant/ 
appellant on the 9th of June, 1994. The motion was denied by two 
separate rulings; one dated June 29, 1994 and a supple-
mentary ruling dated July 12, 1994. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
The Defendant/Appellant was charged in the Eighth District 
Court for Uintah County, State of Utah on the 18th of February, 
1986 with two counts of Aggravated Kidnapping in violation of 
Section 76-5-302 Utah Code Annotated. Each count also provided a 
Firearms Enhancement Provision pursuant to Section 76-3-23 Utah 
Code. On February 26, 1986 the Defendant/Appellant plead guilty 
to Count One of the Information. Count Two of the Information was 
dismissed. The record does not reveal that any affidavit was used 
to assist the court in an explanation of Defendant/appellant's Rule 
11(e) rights at the time of plea. After a colloquy with the 
Honorable Richard Davidson, the court accepted the guilty plea. 
The matter came before the court for sentencing on the 26th day of 
March, 1986, the Honorable Boyd Bunnell presiding.. , The 
defendant/appellant was sentenced to a minimum mandatory sentence 
at the Utah State Prison of 15 years to life with a firearm 
enhancement requiring an additional 5 to 10 years to be served 
consecutively with the 15 years to life sentence. On May 20, 1987 
at the request of the Chairman of the Board of Pardons, the court 
2 
o 
e 
an 
on 
reviewed the Defendant/appe.Unt•. sentence.
 T h e court, th. 
Honorable Dennis Draney presiding, re-affirmed the sentence 
originally imposed. On June ,.
 1 9 M , D e £ e n d a n t H U d , M o t i o n t 
Withdraw Guilty Plea before the Eighth District Court. All th 
prior judges having retired, resigned, or being deceased, the case 
was re-assigned to the Honorable John Anderson. Judge Anderson 
issued a sugary ruling with no response from the State of Otah on 
June 29, 1994 denying al! aspects of Defendant's Motion to Withdraw 
ouilty plea excepting for a response by the state the issue of 
inadequate explanation of the firearms enhancement. After 
considering the state's response, on July !2, !994 Judge Anders 
-sued a ruling denying the Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty 
Plea in its entirety stating that the eou.t had substantially 
complied with the requirements of Rule 11(e). 
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT 
The trial court's denial of the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea 
is in error. The court made no findings thar the appellant waived 
•us right to self incrimination. The court made no findings that 
the appellant understood the nature and elements of the crime and 
that his plea admitted each »«,* -
each and every element. The court 
incorrectly advised the defendant-
 ac •« fu 
renclant as t0
 ^ e maximum sentence which 
could be imposed. 
ARGUMENT 
^ ^ O ^ D R A W ' G S S " 1 ™ BY D m i N G APPELLANT'S 
COMPLY
 WITH RULE IHe) olllrP^MECMSE IT F * " E D TO 
" ' l - t e ) OP THE RULES OP CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
* u l e U ( e > of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure i n e f f e c t 
at the time appellant made his guilty plea as codified in 77-35-
11(e) provided as follows: 
The court . . . shall not accept a (plea of guilty) 
until the court has made the findings: 
(1) That if the defendant is not represented by counsel 
he has knowingly waived his right to counsel and does not 
desire counsel; 
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made: 
(3) That the defendant knows he has rights against 
compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury trial and to 
confront and cross-examine in open court the witnesses 
against him, and that by entering the plea he waives all 
of those rights: 
(4) That the defendant understands the nature and 
elements of the offense to which he is entering the pi a; 
that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of 
proving ecah of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt; 
and that the plea is an admission of all those elements. 
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum and maximum 
sentence that may be imposed upon him for each offense 
to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of 
the imposition of consecutive sentences; and 
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result of a prior 
plea discussion and plea agreement and if so, what 
agreement has been reached. 
The record of the entry of pleas is very limited. From the 
record, it appears that no plea affidavit was used, therefore the 
court can only determined the trial court's compliance with rule 
11 (e) based on the oral representations made m open court. 
That record is bereft of any discussion with the appellant on 
several critical points included in the rule. There is no 
discussion whatsoever with the appellant concerning his right 
against compulsory self incrimination as required by subsection (3) 
4 
of the rule. There is no discussion of the nature and elements of 
the offense of aggravated kidnapping with a firearms enhancement 
as required by Subsection 4 of the rule. There is no discussion 
or record that the guilty pleas was an admission to each of the 
elements of the alleged crime as recuired by subsection 4 (Record, 
PP 4-7). 
The record also reveals that the trial judge affirmative mis-
representated to the appellant the maximum sentence possible as a 
result of the plea. Subsection 5 of the rule required a finding 
that the defendant understands both the minimum and maximum 
possible sentence. At line 12, page 7 of the record, the trial 
judge informed the appellant that a one to five year enhancement 
was possible in addition to the five years to life he originally 
explained. No correction of that error was made. The appellant 
was sentenced to a five to ten year firearm enhancement in direct 
contradiction to what had been explained. 
The standard of review as previously stated is that of an 
abuse of discretion by the court. The companion cases of Warner 
v. Morris, 709 P. 2d 309 (Utah, 1985) and Brooks v. Morris 709 P. 
2d 310, (Utah, 1985), established the standard by which a trial 
court accepts guilty pleas. The Supreme Court stated, that a 
failure of to advise a defendant of his right concerning self-
incrimination was not alone sufficient to invalidated a guilty plea 
provided that the record as a whole showed that the rule 11 
requirements were substantially complied with. Subsequently the 
Supreme Court in State v. Gibbons. 740 P. 2d 1309 (Utah, 1987) 
5 
replaced the "substantial compliance" rule with a "strict 
compliance" standard. It has been ruled that the Gibbons rule was 
not retroactive, however the concepts set forth in Gibbons are 
useful. In Gibbons the court stated that the trial court may not 
rely on defense counsel or affidavits to satisfy the specific 
requirements of Rule 11(e). In his case, where there is nc 
affidavit, the court has a situation much more akin to Gibbons 
factually than might typically be the case. 
The case most similar to this which has reached the appellate 
courts is that of State v. Vasilacopulas, 756 P. 2d 92 (Utah App. 
1988). The Utah Court of Appeals, using the Warner-Brooks test 
found that an absence of discussion concerning the possibility of 
consecutive sentences, and a failure to find that the defendant 
understood that possibility showed a failure to substantially 
comply with Rule 11(e). That alone was sufficient to mandate a 
reversal of the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to 
withdraw guilty plea. The court did not consider a failure to 
comply with Rule 11(e)(4), citing the failure to comply with the 
sentencing portions of the rule as being sufficient. It can be 
presumed that if there had been a problem with an explanation of 
the elements of the offense as there was in this ca?e,, the 
Vasilacopulos Court could have only made its decision stronger. 
It is also interesting to note that one of the concurring judges 
in Vasilacopulos was Richard Davidson, the trial judge who took the 
plea in this case. 
In this case, we have three major failures to even discuss 
6 
rights required by the rule. While the Warner and Brooks cases 
state that a failure to explain the right of self incrimination was 
not fatal in light of the record, the record there was more 
complete than here. Here as well, we have not only a failure to 
inform appellant of the maximum sentence, but a misrepresentation 
by the court as to the maximum sentence. When coupled with the 
failure to discuss the elements of the offense, the combination is 
fatal to the trial court's ruling that the requirements had been 
substantially complied with. Finally, even though there was some 
discussion of some of the Rule 11 requirements at the time the 
plea was entered, no findings were made except that the plea was 
knowingly made. (Record, p 8). 
CONCLUSION 
The record in this case shows affirmative mistakes by the 
court in the taking of appellant's plea. It does not show strict 
compliance, substantial compliance, or anything approaching the 
required standard. Appellant hereby prays that the court reverse 
the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw guilty plea and 
remand the case for further proceedings. 
Dated this 2 ^ day of ^ Q U. u frvA / 1995. 
Alan M. Williams 
Attorney for Appellant 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
WAYNE S. TIPPETT, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 940369 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTTQN AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment and sentence entered 
upon a plea of guilty to the charge of aggravated kidnapping, a 
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 
(Supp. 1986) . 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the trial 
court correctly held that defendant's guilty plea was taken in 
substantial compliance with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, and, hence, properly denied his motion to withdraw his 
plea. The ultimate decision to deny a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Gardner, 844 P.2d 293, 295 (Utah 1992). The underlying 
findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, State v, stilling, 
856 P.2d 666, 670 (Utah App. 1993), while the determination of 
substantial compliance is a (question of law reviewed for 
correctness. ,gee Willett v. Barnes, 842 P.2d 860, 861 (Utah 
1992); State v. Hoff. 814 P.2d 1119, 1124-25 (Utah 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issue presented or. 
appeal is contained in or appended to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF TOE CASE 
Defendant was charged on February 18, 1986, with two 
counts of aggravated robbery, both first degree felonies, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (Supp. 1986) (R. 2-3). 
Addendum A. Each charge included a firearm enhancement pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (Supp. 1986) (id.). Defendant 
waived his preliminary hearing on February 25, 1986, and was 
bound over to district court (R. 16-17) . At the arraignment or. 
February 26, defendant entered a plea of guilty to count one 
pursuant to plea discussions with the State, and the second count 
was dismissed (R. 18; Arraignment Transcript [hereinafter "Tr."] 
34-36, 41) . The court conducted a colloquy with defendant and 
accepted the plea (Tr. 36-41). Following preparation of a 
presentence report, the court sentenced defendant to the Utah 
State Prison to serve a minimum mandatory term of fifteen years 
to life, with a consecutive term of five-to-ten years for the 
firearm enhancement (R. 19-21; Sentencing Transcript [hereinafter 
"Sent. Tr."] 51-53).x Addendum B. 
On May 20, 1987--fourteen months after defendant was 
sentenced--the trial court held a hearing to review defendant's 
sentence after receiving a formal request from the Board of Pardons 
2 
On June 30, 1994, more than eight years after being 
sentenced, defendant filed a E£o ^  motion to withdraw his guilt\ 
plea (R. 72-114) . in response, the trial court sought a written 
response from the State regarding the question of the sentencing 
court's imposition of a different firearm enhancement penalty 
than was explained to defendant when he entered his plea (R. 115-
16). The court denied the remainder of defendant's motion (id.). 
On July 12, 1994, the court entered a supplemental ruling denying 
defendant's motion as it related to the sentence enhancement (R. 
121-22).2 Defendant appeals from these two rulings. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant was arrested and charged with two counts of 
aggravated kidnapping, with a firearms enhancement for each 
count, based on his actions of February 17, 1986 (R. 2-3). On 
Highway 40 outside Vernal, Utah, defendant used a revolver and 
threats of death to force two teenagers to drive him to Rangely, 
Colorado (R. 4-7). Defendant released the boys when they arrived 
in Rangely and was arrested shortly thereafter by the Rangely 
City Police (R. 7). 
(R. 31) . The Board was concerned that the sentence was not in line 
with those sentences received by similar offenders for similar 
crimes, and that defendant "may be able to demonstrate release 
readiness at some time sooner than fifteen years from his 
commitment" (R. 22-24, 26-28). The trial court reviewed 
unspecified information provided at the hearing and affirmed the 
sentence originally imposed upon defendant (R. 31) . This review is 
not challenged on appeal. 
2
 Defendant filed additional motions in the trial court and in 
this Court, none of which bear on the issue raised in this appeal 
(R. 123-26, 127-29, 130-31, 134-37, 140-42, 143, 154-56, 157-59, 
160-61, 162-67). 
3 
Defendant appeared with counsel before the circuit 
court on February 25, 1986, and, after being advised of his 
rights by the court, stated that he understood his rights and 
waived the preliminary hearing (R. 16-17) . The court bound him 
over to the district court for trial (id.). He appeared for 
arraignment before the district court the next morning and pled 
guilty to one count of aggravated kidnapping with the use of a 
firearm (R. 18; Tr. 34-35, 41), In return, the State agreed to 
seek dismissal of the second count of aggravated kidnapping and 
to recommend to the court that "in the event [defendant] is 
transferred to another penitentiary that he be given credit for 
time served in that other penitentiary against his Utah sentence" 
(Tr. 35-36).3 
The judge then questioned defendant concerning the plea 
(a copy of the colloquy is attached as Addendum C) . He first 
established defendant's name, distinguishing it from numerous 
aliases, then ascertained that defendant was not suffering from 
the effects of alcohol or drugs (Tr. 36-37). Defendant admitted 
taking methodome while in Salt Lake, but said he was neither 
taking it nor under its influence as of the hearing (Tr. 37) . 
The court then established that defendant understood why he was 
before the court, that a plea was to be entered, that defendant 
3
 At the time the plea was entered, the record only indicates 
that charges "may be pending" in the federal courts, in Salt Lake 
County, or in South Carolina (R. 18; Tr. 35). Only upon 
preparation of the presentence report for sentencing was the extent 
of defendant's criminal history revealed. See Point IB, footnote 
4 and accompanying text, infra. 
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was prepared to proceed, and that defendant had received a copy 
of the information and waived its reading (id.) . The judge 
explained the first count to defendant and asked whether 
defendant was ready to enter a plea andr if so, what it would be 
(Tr. 37-38) . Defendant responded that he was aware of the charge 
and was prepared to plead guilty (Tr. 38). 
The court then asked defendant if he understood that he 
was giving up his right to a jury trial, to have his appointed 
counsel represent him at trial, to have the State prove each 
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and to be 
convicted by a unanimous jury (Tr. 38-39). Defendant 
acknowledged his understanding of each of these rights (id.). 
The judge also explained defendant's right to confront 
and cross-examine witnesses at trial, to present his own 
witnesses and his defense, and to appeal any conviction he might 
receive, and asked whether defendant understood that his guilty 
plea would waive these rights (Tr. 3 9). Defendant acknowledged 
his understanding of each of these points (id.). 
The court verified that defendant's plea had not been 
obtained through promises or threats, amd that the plea was 
entered of defendant's "own free will and choice" (Tr. 39-40). 
The judge explained the sentence for the first degree felony, 
emphasizing the fact that the court had full discretion in 
determining the sentence and was not bound by any representations 
anyone else might make (Tr* 40-41)• The court also explained 
that the firearm enhancement carried a penalty "of not less than 
5 
one or up to five years" on top of the sentence for the felony 
(Tr. 40) . Finally, defendant acknowledged that he was entering 
the plea because he was "in fact guilty of the crime of 
aggravated kidnapping" (Tr, 41). Defendant then entered a guilty 
plea, which the court found was knowingly and voluntarily made 
(R. 18; Tr. 41). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In advising defendant that his guilty plea subjected 
him to a sentence enhancement of one-to-five years, the 
sentencing court acted in conformance with the information 
available to it at the time it took the guilty plea. Imposition 
at sentencing of a five-to-ten year enhancement was mandated by 
statute once the presentence report revealed defendant's prior 
convictions involving the use of firearms. Where only defendant 
knew of the previous convictions at the time the plea was entered 
and he failed to voice concern over the enhancement either at 
sentencing or a year later when his sentence was reviewed and 
affirmed, this Court should decline to grant withdrawal of the 
guilty plea eight years after its entry. 
Defendant's failure to provide sufficient specificity 
for his claim that the trial court failed to inform him of the 
nature and elements of aggravated kidnapping should defeat his 
claim. Regardless of the ambiguity in defendant's argument, the 
record as a whole demonstrates that defendant was adequately 
appraised of the nature and elements of the offense through his 
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multiple exposures to the information and his colloquy with the 
court. 
This Court should not reach defendant's assertion of 
insufficient findings because he provides neither legal authority 
nor analysis. Even on its merits, the claim does not warrant 
withdrawal of the pre-Gibbona
 pi e a because specific findings on 
all the requirements under rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, are not required where the lower court substantially 
complied with rule 11, and the court's finding that the plea was 
both knowing and voluntary is supported by the record. 
Defendant's claims that the trial court failed to 
inform him of his right against compulsory self-incrimination and 
that the guilty plea constituted an admission to each element of 
the offense are not properly before this Court as they are raised 
for the first time on appeal and defendant argues neither plain 
error nor exceptional circumstances. Accordingly, this Court 
should decline to address these issues. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY 
PLEA WAS APPROPRIATE WHERE THE PRE-GIBBONS PLEA WAS 
TAKEN IN SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 11, UTAH 
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
2L. Introduction 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying 
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because the judge who took 
the plea did not comply with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. Br. of App. at 3-7. He contends that the plea was 
not voluntarily and knowingly entered because the judge 
misrepresented the maximum sentence available for the firearms 
enhancement, did not explain the nature and elements of the 
offense under rule 11(e) (4), did not make sufficient findings 
under rule 11(e), did not mention defendant's right against 
compulsory self-incrimination under rule 11(e)(3), and did not 
explain that the plea constituted an admission to each element of 
the charged offense under rule 11(e) (4) . I£^ at 4-5• 
The colloquy in this case and the absence of a written 
plea affidavit fall short of present-day standards for entry of a 
guilty plea. However, this plea was entered prior to this 
Court's decision in State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309, 1312-14 
(Utah 1987), which held that strict compliance with 
constitutional and procedural requirements during the plea 
colloquy was required before a plea could be entered. Gibbons 
constituted a clear break with previous law and was not given 
retroactive effect. State v. Hoff. 814 P.2d 1119, 1123-24 (Utah 
8 
1991). Instead, pleas taken prior to Gibbons are upheld so long 
as the record as a whole demonstrates "substantial compliance" 
with rule 11 requirements. Willett v. Barnes, 842 P.2d 860, 8S81 
(Utah 1992); ppff, 814 P.2d 1119, 1123-24 (Utah 1991)- This plea 
was taken in accordance with the standards in place prior to 
(gibfrons, and the entire record must be reviewed with that in 
mind. 
The district court denied defendant's motion to 
withdraw his plea below, stating that the sentencing judge had 
"complied with Rule 11 so as to apprise Defendant of his 
Constitutional rights and of the consequences of entering his 
guilty plea" (R. 115) . Addendum D. In a supplemental ruling on 
the firearm enhancement issue, the district court held that "the 
general requirements of Rule 11 were met by the arraignment Judge 
in this case" and that "the Firearm Enhancement sentence that was 
imposed was in compliance with both the Information filed in the 
case and with the information given to the Defendant at the 
arraignment hearing, given the fact that it was only in the 
Defendant's mind and knowledge that there were multiple prior 
firearm convictions" (R. 121). Addendum D. 
BJ. The Trial Court Advised Defendant Of The Appropriate 
Sentence Given The Available Information: Mandatory 
Imposition Of A Greater Enhancement At Sentencing Based On 
New Information Previously Known Only Bv Defendant Does Not 
Warrant Withdrawal Of The Guilty Plea 
Defendant entered his guilty plea nine days following 
commission of the offense, and one day following his waiver of a 
preliminary hearing and his plea discussion with the State (R. 2-
9 
3, 16-18; Tr. 34, 36). No information concerning his criminal 
history was provided to the court at the time he entered his plea 
(R. 119) . During the plea colloquy, the court explained the 
possible sentence for the first degree felony to which defendant 
intended to plead guilty (Tr. 40) . Addendum C. It then 
explained that the offense "also carries with it a firearm 
enhancement penalty of not less than one or up to five years on 
top of that" (i&J • This explanation of the enhancement penalty 
conforms with the language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (Supp. 
1986), which provides that when a person is convicted of a first 
degree felony involving a firearm, the court may impose an 
additional consecutive sentence of at least one year and may 
impose a consecutive indeterminate sentence not exceeding five 
years.4 
4
 Section 76-3-203 provides: 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be 
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as 
follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, 
for a term at not less than five years, unless otherwise 
specifically provided by law, and which may be for life 
but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile 
or the representation of a firearm was used in the 
commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shall 
additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of 
one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
the court may additionally sentence the person convicted 
for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run 
consecutively and not concurrently; 
(4) Any person who has been sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment for a felony in which a firearm was used or 
involved in the accomplishment of the felony and is 
10 
The court ordered preparation of a presentence report 
which revealed that defendant previously had been convicted of ac 
least five robberies involving the use of firearms (Sent. Tr. 48-
49).5 Under these circumstances, the enhancement statute 
mandated imposition of a consecutive sentence of five-to-ten 
years "because the defendant has previously been convicted of a 
felony where a firearm was used in the crime" (R. 19) . Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-203(4} (Supp. 1986) (reproduced in footnote 4 at 
pages 10-11). 
Defendant argues that the trial court's failure to 
inform him of the possible heightened enhancement violated rule 
11. Br. of App. at 5-7. While the record is clear that the 
possibility of a five-to-ten year enhancement was not discussed 
at the plea hearing, that fact does not warrant withdrawal of the 
guilty plea in this case. 
Defendant argues only that the trial court did not 
inform him at the plea hearing that the increased enhancement was 
possible, not that he was surprised by its imposition at 
convicted of another felony when a firearm was used or 
involved in the accomplishment of the felony shall, in 
addition to any other sentence imposed, be sentenced for 
an indeterminate term to be not less than five nor more 
than ten years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The presentence report, which defense counsel acknowledged 
below was "fairly accurate" and consistent with what defendant had 
told him, showed "a very aggravated criminal history," includino 
convictions for five armed robberies in which firearms were used? 
escape from a penitentiary with the use of a firearm, and at least 
four armed robbery counts pending in other jurisdictions, all 
involving the use of firearms (Sent. Tr. 48-49). 
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sentencing. Br. of App. at 5. However, neither the court nor 
the prosecutor had reason to believe at the time of the plea 
hearing that section 76-3-203(4) had any application to this 
case; only defendant was privy to the information at that point. 
Based on the information available to it, the court disclosed the 
sentencing information it reasonably believed to be relevant to 
the proceedings. A review of the subsequent sentencing 
proceedings gives rise to the reasonable inference that at 
sentencing, everyone understood that the mandatory enhancement 
under section 76-3-203(4) would be imposed because of the 
information revealed in the presentence report (Tr. 48-51). 
Defendant gave no indication that the increased enhancement was 
unexpected; his counsel conceded the accuracy of the report and 
revealed that he and defendant had discussed the information 
prior to preparation of the report (Sent. Tr. 47), and defendant 
knew that the aggravated kidnapping charge was subject to the 
firearm enhancement statute. Defendant remained silent when the 
increased enhancement was announced, and he continued his silence 
even though his sentence was reviewed a year later at the request 
of the Board of Pardons.6 Although defendant asserted below his 
counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to object to the 
enhancement change at sentencing (R. 80-81) , he does not renew 
that claim on appeal. 
Where it is clear that the lower court acted in 
conformance with the information available to it at the time it 
* See note 1, supra. 
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took the guilty plea, and that defendant voiced no concern over 
the increased enhancement, despite being in a position to do so, 
this Court should decline to grant withdrawal of the guilty plea 
eight years after its entry. 
^ D*M F ? i T l A q A If*?1* TVTnnnBtrates ™** Defendant TTn,Wct-,^ Both The Nature AnH T K ,
 P] eTnents of \aarmt*A KiAr>»^Z 
Defendant argues that the trial court failed to fully 
apprise him of the nature and elements of aggravated 
kidnapping.7 Br. of App. at 5] 7. However, he fails to set 
forth any particular deficiency in the court's explanation of the 
charge. His failure to develop his position or to provide 
'Aggravated kidnapping is defined as follows: 
r ^ ™ 1 - 5 person, commits aggravated kidnaping if the 
?!« *~*^tentionally or knowingly, without authority of 
ft .!? against *** w i H of the victim, by any means and 
J L ^ L ? a n n e ? ' u 8 < T 1 2 e s ' cosines, detains, or transports tne victim with intent: 
(a) To hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or 
nostage, or to compel a third person to engage in 
particular conduct or to forbear from engaging in 
particular conduct; or 
t(b) To facilitate the commission, attempted 
commission, or flight after commission or attempted 
commission of a felony; or 
(c) To inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the 
victim or another; or 
(d) To interfere with the performance of any 
governmental or political function; or 
(e) To commit a sexual offense as described in Part 
4 of this chapter. 
X ^ S S i ^ i 1 76-5-305 <Supp. 1986). The information reflected 
2-3) AddeSuifE^ 3 9 6 8 u b s e c t i o n <1> <a> " <c) for each count (R. 
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sufficient specificity in his assertion of error should defeat 
his claim. State v. Wareham. 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) 
(refusing to reach an issue which was inadequately briefed); 
State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984); State v. 
Price. 827 P.2d 247, 248-50 (Utah App. 1992). 
Regardless of the ambiguity in defendant's argument, 
the record as a whole demonstrates that defendant was adequately 
appraised of the nature and elements of the offense before 
entering his plea. He had appeared in court five days prior to 
entering his plea and listened to the court read the information 
(R. 13, 18). The information reflected the language of the 
aggravated kidnapping statute, including the requisite elements 
of the crime (R. 2-3) . Addendum E. Although the information did 
not include a detailed account of the underlying facts of the 
crime, it apprised defendant that the offense involved two 
victims whom he allegedly kidnapped at the same time in Uintah 
County (id.) .8 
Defendant appeared in court again the day before 
entering his plea (R. 16-18). The minute entry of the hearing 
reflects that n[t]he Court explained rights to defendant. 
Defendant stated he understood his rights [J11 the court granted 
the waiver and bound defendant over to the district court (R. 
16) . The next day defendant entered his guilty plea (R. 18) . 
During the colloquy, after the court established that defendant 
1
 Defendant raises no challenge on appeal to the adequacy cf 
the factual basis for the plea. 
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had received a copy
 0f the information, the court paraphrased the 
statutory language from the information: -You understand, Mr. 
Tippett, that you are charged with the crime of aggravated 
kidnapping in violation of [section] 76-5-302. That's a first 
degree felony, which alleges that you at the time and place 
[indicated] did take control of people and cause them to be 
transported against their will. You held them under your control 
against their will, and that in fact you did utilize a firearm in 
the commission of that offense." (Tr. 37-38). Addendum C. This 
recitation includes the critical elements of the offense and, 
when combined with the information, sufficiently defined the 
offense so that defendant was apprised of the nature of the 
offense to which he was pleading guilty and the critical elements 
involved. ££. United Stares v. w^ai,
 912 F.2d 1119, 1124 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (critical elements, not every element, of pleaded-to 
crime should be explained). 
In his motion below, defendant argued that the trial 
court omitted any reference to the intent requirement of the 
offense (R. 77-78).' To the extent his ambiguous argument on 
appeal includes this point, the argument is without merit. 
n f ^ a ^lndaJt: ?lso asserted below that, the nature and elements 
?L* % ?? w h l c h muvst b e explained by the court include the fact 
p ^ L i ^ f ^ ^ 5 n5 a n" n i e n t statute provides for an increased 
!?™"™ e i?B ^ U l d . h e .hav* Prior f e l o ny convictions involving 
dir?,^! ;?• T° t h e **tei* h i s ambiguous argument on appeal 
£*« iS?,* " £ • M»«Jion, the claim is without merit. This Court 
£?!.„«. e*5 SUCil enhanc=ement statutes are not part of the 
?h2f!I:* iKu V- *TT' 7 5° P' 2 d 186' 1 9 2 {Utah 1988). Hence, 
•?2L2? 2°**. l n c l u d e d within an explanation of the nature and 
elements of the crime. £e£ also Point IB, supra. 
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ueienaant was appraised of the requisite intent through his 
multiple exposures to the information, which echoed the statutory 
explanation of intent (R. 13, 18; Tr. 37). Further, while the 
court did not specifically identify or define the intent element, 
intent could reasonably be inferred from the language used by the 
court at the plea hearing. The court's explanation that 
defendant had taken control of people, transported them and held 
them against their will by use of a firearm reasonably reflects 
the requisite intent for the offense. Defendant makes no claim 
that he was unaware of the intent requirement or that he could 
not have reasonably determined the requisite intent element from 
the information available to him. The nature and elements of 
this particular offense are clear and readily understandable and 
were adequately imparted to defendant prior to entry of his plea 
without the need for the exacting particularity he seeks to 
impose on the lower court. 
D. The Lack Of Detailed Findings Is Not Critical Where The 
Court Specifically Found, And The Record Establishes. That 
Defendant Entered His Plea With Full Knowledge And 
Understanding Of Its Consequences And The Rights He Was 
Waiving 
Defendant's brief concludes with a one-line assertion 
that "even though there was some discussion of some of the Rule 
11 requirements at the time the plea was entered, no findings 
were made except that the plea was knowingly made." Br. of App. 
at 7. This assertion, without legal authority or analysis, is 
insufficient to warrant review by this Court. Wareham. 772 P.2d 
at 966; Amicone. 689 P.2d at 1344. 
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Even if it is reached, the claim is without merit. 
Although the trial court needs to establish the rule 11 
information, it need not enter specific findings so long as the 
record reflects that the requisite inquiries were made and that 
the plea was made knowingly and voluntarily. See State v. 
flillqr, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (the absence 
of a finding under rule 11 is not critical so long as the record 
affirmatively establishes that the plea was entered with full 
knowledge and understanding of its consequences and of the rights 
being waived) ; ££e also State v. Truiillo-Martinez. 814 P.2d 596, 
600-01 (Utah App. 1991) (addressing post-Gibbons plea, absence of 
express findings did not warrant withdrawal of plea where the 
record established that all rule 11 requirements were addressed 
and supported the court's conclusion that the plea was freely and 
voluntarily made), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). 
In this case, the trial court completed the colloquy 
and affirmatively found that it was "satisfied that the defendant 
has a knowledge of his rights and that this plea is a voluntary 
act" (R. 18; Tr. 41). Although the pre-Gibbons exchange did not 
strictly follow the litany of rule 11, it substantially complied 
with the rule, and the record as a whole supports the court's 
ultimate determination of both knowledge and voluntariness. See 
Hoff. 814 P.2d at 1123-24 (requiring only substantial 
compliance); Tru-iillo-Marting^. 814 P.2d at 600. 
Defendant was apprised of the charges and knew by 
virtue of the information that he faced two counts of aggravated 
17 
kidnapping--each involving the use of a firearm--for having 
kidnapped two victims. At the plea hearing, he confirmed his 
understanding of the charges, claimed he was fully aware of the 
reason for the hearing, denied being under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs, and asserted his readiness to enter the plea 
despite his knowledge that doing so would waive his 
constitutional rights (Tr. 36-38). Addendum C. He also admitted 
that he was Min fact guilty of the crime of aggravated 
kidnapping" (Tr. 41). Addendum C. 
Defendant demonstrated no confusion or uncertainty 
regarding his rights or the offense he was admitting, but 
presented himself as being informed and knowledgeable. During 
the colloquy, he answered the court directly without any 
hesitation or evidence of confusion, giving definite, unequivocal 
answers and seeking no clarification or explanation concerning 
the plea or his rights. In contrast, he did not hesitate to 
voice his uncertainties over his sentencing immediately following 
entry of his plea; he freely explained his confusion to the 
court, then volunteered to follow his counsel's recommendation 
(Tr. 42). Addendum C. 
The only requirement not discussed prior to entry of 
the plea was the application of the increased enhancement based 
on prior felony convictions involving the use of firearms. As 
established above, the fact that this part of the enhancement 
statute had any application in this case was unknown to anyone 
but defendant prior to preparation of the presentence report. 
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Defendant was neither surprised by the enhancement penalty 
ultimately imposed nor concerned that his plea had been entered 
without full knowledge of the sentence he faced, as evidenced by 
his failure to avail himself of the opportunity to address the 
point prior to entry of the final judgment or upon review of his 
sentence one year later. 
That defendant acted voluntarily is also apparent from 
the record. He admitted that no one had induced his plea through 
threats or promises (Tr. 39-40), that no one had made any 
representations concerning sentencing (Tr. 41), that he was fully 
aware that the court had sole responsibility over sentencing 
regardless of the parties' recommendations (Tr. 41), and that he 
was ready to enter his plea, doing so of his "own free will and 
choice" (Tr. 40-41). Nothing suggests that defendant was or had 
reason to be duplicitious or insincere in his responses to the 
court. 
Because the record reflects substantial compliance with 
rule 11 and supports the court's finding that defendant entered 
the plea knowingly and voluntarily, the lack of any express 
findings on rule 11 factors does not warrant withdrawal of the 
plea. See Truiillo-Martinez. 814 P.2d at 600-01. 
JL. The Claims Involving The Right Against Compulsory Self-
incrimination And Admission Of Each Element Of The Offense 
Were Not Raised Below And Are Not Properly Before This Court 
Although defendant's pro se motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea below addressed a number of issues, it did not 
include any claim that the trial court failed to discover whether 
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defendant knew of his right against compulsory self-incriminaticr 
or that the court failed to explain that his plea would admit 
each element of the offense (R. 72-88) . Addendum F. 
Accordingly, these two issues are not properly before this Court. 
State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851# 853-54 (Utah 1992); Gibbons. 740 
P.2d at 1311. 
Aside from raising the issues for the first time on 
appeal, defendant fails to argue either plain error or 
exceptional circumstances to justify appellate review of the 
issues. Because he fails to include either argument in his 
opening brief, this Court should refuse to consider them.10 See 
10
 Moreover, neither exceptional circumstances nor plain errc 
exists in this case to warrant review of the unpreserved issues 
The record reflects no exceptional circumstances warranting a 
exception to this Court's general rule. Further, the law i 
existence at the time the plea was entered made it clear that th 
court taking a guilty plea^did not have to specifically follow th 
litany set forth in rule 11(e) so long as the court found the pis 
to be knowing and voluntary and the record, as a whole, establish* 
that the plea was entered "with full knowledge and understanding c 
its consequences and of the right3 he was waiving[.]" See Warns 
v. Morrjs, 709 ?.2d 309, 310 (Utah 1985); Brooks v. Morris, 7C 
P.2d 310, 311 (Utah 1985) (per curiam). As established in Poir. 
ID, supra, this standard was met here. Any oversight by the lowe 
court in addressing defendant's right against self-incrimination c 
his admission of the elements of the offense would not constitut 
plain error where the court was not required to strictly compl 
with rule 11(e) and was, as established by the entire recorc 
otherwise justified in finding that the plea was, nevertheless 
both voluntary and knowing. See Point ID, supra. 
Finally, although the court did not expressly say tha 
defendant'3 plea effectively admitted each of the elements of t; 
offense, defendant freely admitted before entering his plea that ; 
was "in fact guilty of the crime of aggravated kidnapping" (?: 
41) , Hence, express reference to the fact that the pi* 
constituted a separate admission to the offense would not affec 
the knowing or voluntary nature of the plea. Accordingly, th. 
Court should not reach defendant's unpreserved claims. 
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state v. Jennings. 875 P.2d 566, 570 (Utah App. 1994) (refusing 
to reach an issue raised for the first time on appeal absent an 
assertion by defendant of either exceptional circumstances or 
plain error); State v. Bello. 871 P.2d 584, 587-88 n.3 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied. 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994); State v. 
Seoulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 917-18 & n.5 (Utah App. 1992); fi£. 
Brown. 853 P.2d at 854 n.l (refusing to reach a state 
constitutional issue not presented in appellant's opening brief); 
State v. Laffertv. 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988), aff'd, 
776 P.2d 631 (Utah 1989), varai-prf on other grounds sub nom. 
Laffertv v. Cook. 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991) ("we will not 
engage in a state constitutional analysis unless an argument for 
different analyses under the state and federal constitutions is 
briefed.-). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and 
sentence. • 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / 3 day of March, 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney/General 
^KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT F 
Canon 5 SUPREME COURT RULES OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 10<4 
(2) shall not practice law in the court on which the judge 
serves or in any court subject to the appellate jurisdiction of 
that court, or act as a lawyer in a proceeding in which the 
judge has served as a judge or in any other proceeding related 
thereto. 
B. Judges pro tempore. A judge pro tempore shall comply 
with Canons 1, 2A, 3B, 3E, and 3F. A judge pro tempore 
appointed pursuant to § 78-6-1.5 shall not practice law in the 
same small claims division m which the judge serves. 
C. Court commissioners. A court commissioner u subject to 
this Code to the same extent as a full-time judge. 
D. Active senior judges. An active senior judge is not re-
quired to comply with Canon 4F. 
E. Senior judges. A senior judge is not required to comply 
with the provisions of this Code. 
CHAPTER 13. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
Preamble A Lawyer's Responsibilities. 
Scope. 
Terminology. 
Client-Lawyer Relationship 
Rule 
1.1. Competence. 
1.2. Scope of representation. 
1 3 Diligence. 
1.4 Communication. 
1.5. Fees. 
1.6. Confidentiality of information. 
1.7. Conflict of interest general rule. 
1.8. Conflict of interest: prohibited transactions. 
1.9. Conflict of interest- Former client. 
1.10. Imputed disqualification: general rule. 
1.11. Successive government and private employment. 
1.12. Former judge or arbitrator. 
1.13. Organization as a client. 
1.14 Client under a disability 
1.15. Safekeeping property. 
1.16. Declining or terminating representation. 
Counselor 
2.1. Advisor. 
2.2. Intermediary 
2.3. Evaluation for use by third persons. 
Advocate 
3.1. Meritorious claims and contentions. 
3.2. Expediting litigation. 
3.3. Candor toward the tribunal. 
3 4. Fairness to opposing party and counsel. 
3.5. Impartiality and decorum of the tribunal. 
3.6. Thai publicity. 
3.7 Lawyer as witness. 
3.8. Special responsibilities of a prosecutor 
3 9 Advocate in nonadjudicative proceedings 
Transactions With Persons Other Thai* 
Clients 
4.1. Truthfulness in statements to others. 
4 2. Communication with person represented by counsel. 
4 3. Dealing with unrepresented person. 
4.4. Respect for rights of third persons. 
Law Firms And Associations 
5 1 Responsibilities of a partner or supervisory lawyer. 
5 2. Responsibilities of a subordinate lawyer. 
5 3 Responsibilities regarding noniawyer assistants. 
Rule 
5.4. Professions] independence of a lawyer. 
5.5. Unauthorized practice of law. 
5.6. Restrictions on right to practice. 
Public Service 
6.1. Pro bono publico service. 
6.2. Accepting appointments. 
6.3. Membershjp in legal services organization. 
6.4. Law reform activities affecting client interests. 
Information About Legal Services 
7.1. Communications concerning a lawyer's services 
7.2. Advertising 
7.3. Direct contact with prospective clients. 
7 4. Communication of fields of practice. 
7.5. Firm names and letterheads. 
Maintaining The Integrity Of The Profession 
8.1. Bar admission and disciplinary matters. 
8.2. Judicial officials. 
8.3. Reporting professional misconduct. 
8.4. Misconduct. 
8.5. Jurisdiction. 
Preamble: A lawyer's Responsibilities. 
A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal 
system and a public citizen having special responsibility far 
the quality of justice. 
As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs vanooi 
functions. As advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an 
informed understanding of the client's legal rights and oblig*-
tions and explains then* practical implications. As advocate, a 
lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of 
the adversary system. As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result 
advantageous to the client but consistent with requirements of 
honest dealing with others. As intermediary between clients, a 
lawyer seeks to reconcile their divergent interests as an 
advisor and, to a limited extent, as a spokesperson for each 
client. A lawyer acts as evaluator by examining a client's legal 
affairs and reporting about them to the client or to others. A 
lawyer's representation of a client, including representation 
by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the 
client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities. 
In all professional functions, a lawyer should be competent, 
prompt and diligent A lawyer should maintain communica-
tion with a client concerning the representation- A lawyer 
should keep in confidence information relating to representa-
tion of a cheat except so far as disclosure is required or 
permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or othei law. 
A lawyer's conduct should conform to the requirements of 
the law, both in professional service to clients and in the 
lawyer's business and personal affairs. A lawyer should use 
the law's procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to 
harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate 
respect for the legal system and for those who serve i*i 
including judges, other lawyers and public officials. While it is 
a lawyer's duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of. 
official action it is also a lawyer's duty to uphold legal process. 
As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the 
law, the administration of justice and the quality of servifl? 
rendered by -he legal profession. As a member of a learned 
profession, a lawyer should cultivate knowledge of the law 
beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge m reform«* 
the law and work to strengthen legal education. A lawy«* 
should be mindful of deficiencies in the administration «• 
justice and of the fact that the poor, and sometimes persons' 
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who are not poor, cannot afford adequate legal assistance and 
should therefore devote professional tune and avic influence 
in their behalf. A lawyer should aid the legal profession in 
pursuing these objectives and should help the Bar regulate 
itself in the public interest. 
Many of a lawyer's professional responsibilities are pre-
scribed in the Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as 
substantive and procedural law. However, a lawyer is also 
guided by personal conscience and the approbation of profes-
sional peers. A lawyer should strive to attain the highest level 
of skill, to improve the law and the legal profession and to 
exemplify the legal profession's ideal of public service. 
A lawyer's responsibilities as a representative of clients, an 
officer of the legal system and a public citizen are usually 
harmonious. Thus, when an opposing party is well repre-
sented, a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on behalf of a client 
and at the same tune assume that justice is being done. So 
also, a lawyer can be sure that preserving client confidences 
ordinarily serves the public interest because people are more 
likely to seek legal advice, and thereby heed their legal 
obligations, when they know their communications will be 
private. 
In the nature of law practice, however, conflicting responsi-
bilities are encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems 
arise from conflict between a lawyer's responsibilities to 
clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer's own interest in 
remaining an upright person while earning a satisfactory 
living The Rules of Professional Conduct prescribe terms for 
iving such conflicts. Within the framework of these Rules, 
many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise. Such 
issues must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive 
professional and moral judgment guided by the basic princi-
ples underlying the Rules. 
The legal profession is largely self-governing. Although 
other professions also have been granted powers of self-
government, the legal profession is unique m this respect 
because of the close relationship between the profession and 
the processes of government and law enforcement This con-
nection is manifested m the fact that ultimate authority over 
the legal profession is vested largely m the courts. 
lb the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their 
professional calling, the occasion for government regulation is 
obviated. Self-regulation also helps maintain the legal profes-
sion's independence from government domination. An inde-
pendent legal profession is an important force in preserving 
government under law, for abuse of legal authority is more 
readily challenged by a profession whose members are not 
dependent on government for the right to practice. 
The legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it 
special responsibilities of self-government The profession has 
a responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in 
the public interest and not m furtherance of parochial or 
self-interested concerns of the Bar Every lawyer is responsi-
ble for observance of the Rules of Professional Conduct A 
lawyer should also aid m securing their observance by other 
lawyers. Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the 
^dependence of the profession and the public interest which it 
serves. 
La wye: 
"onal ConductTwhen ororTrlv , ^* ^ R u i e a 0 ^ ° * * -
*lationship P r°p e* l y a p p h e d ' " ™ * define that 
3c, ope. 
The Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of reason. They 
Jhouid be interpreted with reference to the purposes of legal 
^presentation and of the law itself. Some of the Rules are 
imperatives, cast in the terms "shall" or "shall not" These 
define proper conduct for purposes of professional discipline. 
Others, generally cast m the term "may," are permissive and 
define areas under the Rules in which the lawyer has profes-
sional discretion. No disciplinary action should be taken when 
the lawyer chooses not to act or acts within the bounds of such 
discretion. Other Rules define the nature of relationships 
between the lawyer and others. The Rules are thus partly 
obligatory and disciplinary and partly constitutive and de-
scriptive m that they define a lawyer's professional role. Many 
of the Comments use the term "should." Comments do not add 
obligations to the Rules but provide guidance for practicing m 
compliance with the Rules. 
The Rules presuppose a larger legal context shaping the 
lawyer's role. That context includes court rules and statutes 
relating to matters of licensure, laws defining specific obliga-
tions of lawyers and substantive and procedural law in gen-
eral Compliance with the Rules, as with all law m an open 
society, depends pnmaniy upon understanding and voluntary 
compliance, secondarily upon reinforcement by peer and pub-
lic opinion and finally, when necessary, upon enforcement 
through disciplinary proceedings. The Rules do not, however, 
exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should 
inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be 
completely defined by legal rules. The Rules simply provide a 
framework for the ethical practice of law 
Furthermore, for purposes of determining the lawyer's 
authonty and responsibility, principles of substantive law 
external to these Rules determine whether a client-lawyer 
relationship exists. Most of the duties flowing from the client-
lawyer relationship attach only after the client has requested 
that the lawyer render legal services and the lawyer has 
agreed to do so. But there are some duties, such as that of 
confidentiality under Rule 1.6, that may attach when the 
lawyer agrees to consider whether a client-lawyer relationship 
shall be established. Whether a client-lawyer relationship 
exists for any specific purpose can depend on the circum-
stances and may be a question of fact. 
Under vanous legal provisions, including constitutional, 
statutory and common law, the responsibilities of government 
lawyers may include authonty concerning legal matters that 
ordmanly reposes m the client m pnvate client-lawyer rela-
tionships. For example, a lawyer for a government agency may 
have authonty on behalf of the government to decide upon 
settlement or whether to appeal from an adverse judgment. 
Such authonty in vanous respects is generally vested m the 
attorney general and the state's attorney in state government, 
and their federal counterparts, and the same may be true of 
other government law officers. Also, lawyers under the super-
vision of these officers may be authorized to represent several 
government agencies lnintragovernmental legal controversies 
in circumstances where a pnvate lawyer could not represent 
multiple private clients. They also may have authonty to 
represent the "public interest" in circumstances where a 
pnvate lawyer would not be authorized to do so. These Rules 
do not abrogate any such authonty. 
Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed 
by a Rule is a basis for invoking the disciplinary process. The 
Rules presuppose that disciplinary assessment of a lawyer's 
conduct will be made on the basis of the facts and circum-
stances as they existed at the time of the conduct m question 
and m recognition of the fact that a lawyer often has to act 
upon uncertain or incomplete evidence of the situation. More-
over, the Rules presuppose that whether or not discipline 
should be imposed for a violation and the seventy of a sanction 
depend on all the circumstances, such as the willfulness and 
senousness of the violation, extenuating factors and whether 
there have been previous violations. Disciplinary action shall 
be governed by the Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State 
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Bar, and the burden of proof shall be on the State Bar to 
sustain any allegation of violation by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action, 
nor should it create any presumption that a legal duty has 
been breached. The Rules are designed to provide guidance to 
lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct 
through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a 
basis for civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the Rules 
can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties 
as procedural weapons. The fact that a Rule is a just K««i« for 
a lawyer's self-assessment or for sanctioning a lawyer under 
the administration of a disciplinary authority does not imply 
that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction 
has standing to seek enforcement of the Rule. Accordingly, 
nothing in the Rule should be deemed to augment any sub-
stantive legal duty of lawyers or the extra-disciplinary conse-
quences of violating such a duty. 
Moreover, these Rules are not intended to govern or affect 
judicial application of either the client-lawyer or work product 
privilege. Those privileges were developed to promote compli-
ance with law and fairness in litigation. In reliance on the 
client-lawyer privilege, clients are entitled to expect that 
communications within the scope of the privilege will be 
protected against compelled disclosure. The client-lawyer 
privilege is that of the client and not of the lawyer. The fact 
that in exceptional situations the lawyer under t i e Rules has 
a limited discretion to disclose a client confidence does not 
vitiate the proposition that, as a general matter, the client has 
a reasonable expectation that information relating to the 
client will not be voluntarily disclosed and that disclosure of 
such information may be judicially compelled only in accor-
dance with the recognized exceptions to the client-lawyer and 
work product privileges. 
The lawyer's exercise of discretion not to disclose informa-
tion under Rule 1.6 should not be subject to reexamination. 
Permitting such reexamination would be incompatible with 
the general policy of promoting compliance with law through 
assurances that communications will be protected against 
disclosure. 
The Comment accompanying each Rule explains and illus-
trates the meaning and purpose of the Rule. The Preamble 
and this note on Scope provide general orientation. The 
Comments are intended as guides to interpretation, but the 
text of each Rule is authoritative. Research notes were pre-
pared to compare counterparts in the Code of Professional 
Responsibility (approved by the Utah Supreme Court Febru-
ary 19, 1971) and to provide selected references to other 
authorities. The notes have not been adopted, do not consti-
tute part of the Rules and are not intended to affect the 
application or interpretation of the Rules and Comments. 
Terminology. 
"Belief or "believes" denotes that the person involved 
actually supposed the fact in question to be true, A person's 
belief may be inferred from circumstances. 
"Consult* or "consultation* denotes communication of infor-
mation reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate 
the significance of the matter in question. 
"Firm" or "law firm'* denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a private 
firm, lawyers employed in the legal department of a corpora-
tion or other organization and lawyers employed in a legal 
services organization. See Comment, Rule 1.10. 
"Fraud" or "fraudulent" denotes conduct having a purpose to 
deceive and not mereiy negligent misrepresentation or failure 
to apprise another of relevant information. 
"Knowingly," "known" or "knows" denotes actual knowledge 
of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be uaferred 
from circumstances. 
"Partner" denotes a member of a partnership and a iK. 
holder in a law firm organized as a professional coiporitST 
•Reasonable" or •reasonably," when used in relat^T^ 
conduct by a lawyer, denotes the conduct of a n i i ^ 
prudent and competent lawyer. —•uaa0jT 
•Reasonable belief* or •reasonably believes wnen used * 
reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes tk« 
matter in question and that the circumstances are such th*t 
the belief is reasonable. 
•Reasonably should know," when used in reference to 
lawyer, denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence tnd 
competence would ascertain the matter in question. 
•Substantial" when used in reference to degree or extent 
denotes a mafcsrial matter of clear amd weighty importance. 
CT JENT-LAWYER RELATIONSHIP 
Rule 1.1. Competence. 
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client 
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, jikaQ, 
thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the 
representation. 
Rule 1.2. Scope of representation. 
(a) A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning 
the objectives of representation, subject to paragraphs (b), (c), 
(d), and shall consult with the client as to the means by which 
they are to be pursued. A lawyer shall abide by a clientfi 
decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter. 
In a criminal case, a lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, 
after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, 
whether to wsrive jury trial and whether the client will testify. 
(b) A lawyer may limit the objectives of the representation 
if the client consents after consultation. 
(c) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a 
client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraud-
ulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any 
proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or 
assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the 
validity, scope, meaning or application of the law. 
(d) When a lawyer knows that a client expects assistance 
not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other 
law, the lawyer shall consult with the client regarding the 
relevant limitations on the lawyer's conduct 
Role 1.3. Diligence. 
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and prompt-
ness in representing a client. 
Rule 1.4. Communication. 
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about 
the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable 
requests for information. 
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably 
necessary to enable the client to make informed decisions 
regarding the representation. 
Rule 1.5. Fees. 
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge or 
collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee. A fee is clearfr 
excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer » 
ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and fifl» 
conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee. Facto** 
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(1) The time and labor renmV-** *L 
of the questions i w o l ^ J S l S ^ * ' n d d a B o % 
legal service properly, ™U m l u l a l t e to perform the 
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to th. „i- . ^ 
tance of the particular ^ S , . . ? " * • t l t t t &« accep. 
ployment by K J y T r P ™" ^ p r e c l u d e "beTe*. 
l e S 2 S i e B i t 0 M ^ * » • " » » * • locality for similar 
circumstances; ^posea by the client or by the 
(6) The nature and length of th* r w • , 
with the client; ^ ^ ^ e P™fe*»onal relationship 
(8) Whether the fe* i* <W~J . 
(M Wfe^Tu i w ^ ^ o r contingent 
contingent fee is prohibited by o a n ^ h 2 ? * " m w h i c h * 
contingent fee agLn^enfshau b e l ^ ^ " 0 t h e r Uw" A 
^ e m e t h o d b y S t h e k e T t o t d e S ^ J a d f ^ ^ 
Percentage or percentages t h ^ . h l n M M d ' h i d i n g the 
t e event of ^ S S T ^ I l S ^ S ^ tow*r * 
«•*««, to be deducted SZ £ e S J ^ 0 0 "* o t h e r 
«P*nses are to be d e d u c ^ ^ ^ T ! ? d Wfaether *«<* 
{• calculated. Upon concluWofl Z£? *?*»>*>9** fee 
lawyer shall provide t f c T S L S " i f f ^ S * * *** * e 
•Wing the outcome of the mattered tf ^ " ^ •*•*"•»» 
.howmg the remittance t o X c u e m afd ^ f " i I " w w * 
determination. ™ "» method of its 
J * g « ~ shaOnot enter into an a^angement for, char* 
^ ^ 1 S £ ^ £ * « *» Parent or 
or upon the amount of S o n ? * \ ^ ^ ° { a ^ " e 
settlement in lieu thereof; or P P M t ' o r P«P««y 
RuJeU 
. f lJ ! i e r t a b I ! i a h a d a i m o r d e f e M e o n behalf of the lawyer in 
based upon conduct in which the dient w a S v e d f o r 
^ To^compl, rth the Rules of Professional Conduct or 
J S / S T S * ^ 1 d k n t **»*" counseling a law-yer(s) about the need for or availability of treataent for 
S S S T r f S r IT, W * * » > - emotional p r o S , * 
Bale 1.7. Conflict of interest general rule. 
UM Each chent consents after consultation, 
tion of t & f ^ a o t «P"«>ent a client if the represent 
consultation 2 S l i S S ? ? * m a t t e r " ^ " ^ n , the 
imphcatioM o S e ™ " P ^ o n to each client of the 
t £ S £ £ utvolveT " ^ " " ^ «* * • «*>** 
4 l^rad^r^r^6 - « - °f 
(2) Each chent consents after consultation. 
Rule l A Conflict of interest: prohibited transactions. 
J ^ pungent fee for r e p u t i n g . defendant in
 a 
^ ^ b e ^ e ^ " ^ ^ — in the 
^ < ^ ^ w ^ ^ ^ ^ 
^ a s s u m e s joint r e s p o n s i S ^ J h T ^ ^ e n t , each 
«) The client is advised o f a i d ^ n T ^ " * * 0 * 
^
Q
^ « f f lawyers involve? anT ' " ^ * * • (3) The total fee is reasonable. 
R«le 1.6. ConfidentUUtv of information. 
^ f fnt consent, after d i s c w f P a r a g r a p h *>' ^e^ 
C r ^ K S T a S 8UCh ^ " « - ^e «tent the 
eath or substantial b ^ S ^ Z » ^ to result £ 
" t ! = \ ? p «P<^an 0 o r tnS 8 t a n t l a J ^ ^ to * • 
*ces bad been use^ C o n u m M , o n * wluch the lawyerTa^! 
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with 
a client or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, secu-
rity or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless: 
(1) The transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires 
the interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully 
disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner 
which can be reasonably understood by the client; and 
(2) The client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the 
advice of independent counsel in the transaction; and 
(3) The client consents in writing thereto. 
(b) A lawyer shall not use information relating to represen-
tation of a client to the disadvantage of the dient unless the 
client consents after consultation. 
(c) A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the 
lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as parent, child, 
sibling or spouse any substantial gift from a client, including 
a testamentary gift, except where the client is related to the 
donee. 
(d) Prior to the conclusion of representation of a client, a 
lawyer shall not make or negotiate an agreement giving the 
lawyer literary or media rights to. a portrayal or an account 
based in substantial part on information relating to the 
representation. 
(e) A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client 
in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except: 
(DA lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of 
litigation the repayment of which may be contingent on the 
outcome of the matter; and 
(2) A lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court 
costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client. 
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(f) A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing 
a client from one other than the client unless: 
(1) The client consents after consultation; 
(2) There is no interference with the lawyer's independence 
of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relation-
ship; and 
(3) Information relating to representation of a client is 
protected as required by Rule 1.6. 
(g) A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not 
participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims of 
or against the clients or in a criminal case an aggregated 
agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each 
client consents after consultation, including disclosure of the 
existence and nature of all the Haim« or pleas involved and of 
the participation of each person in the settlement. 
(h) A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively 
limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless 
permitted by law and the client is independently represented 
in making the agreement or settle a claim for such liability 
with an unrepresented client or former client without first 
advising that person in writing that independent representa-
tion is appropriate in connection therewith. 
(i) A lawyer related to another lawyer as parent, child, 
sibling or spouse shall not represent a client in a representa-
tion directly adverse to a person who the lawyer knows is 
represented by the other lawyer except upon consent by the 
client after consultation regarding the relationship. 
(j) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the 
cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is 
conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may: 
(1) Acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fee 
or expenses; and 
(2) Contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in 
a civil case. 
Rule 1.3. Conflict of interest: Former client. 
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter 
shall not thereafter: 
(a) Represent another person in the same or a substantially 
factually related matter in which that person's interests are 
materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless 
the former client consents after consultation; or 
(b) Use information relating to the representation to the 
disadvantage of the former client except as Rule 1.6 would 
permit with respect to a client or when the information has 
become generally known. 
Rule 1.10. Imputed disqualification: general rule. 
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them 
shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them 
practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rule 1.7, 
1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.2. 
(b) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm 
may not knowingly represent a person in the same or a 
substantially factually related matter in which that lawyer, or 
a firm with which the lawyer has associated, had previously 
represented a client whose interests are materially adverse to 
that person and about whom the lawyer had acquired infor-
mation protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that is material to 
the matter. 
(c) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a 
firm, the firm is not prohibited from thereafter representing a 
person with interests materially adverse to those of a client 
represented by the formerly associated lawyer unless: 
(1) The matter is the same or substantially related to that 
in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the 
client; and 
(2) Any lawyer remaining in the firm has inform**^ 
protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that is material to a* 
matter. 
(d) A disqualification prescribed by this Rule may be warnd 
by the affected client under the conditions stated in Rule L7 
Rule 1.11. Successive government and private empW 
ment. 
(a) Except a* law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer 
shall not represent a private client in connection with a m»tter 
in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially 
as a public officer or employee, unless the appropriate govern-
ment agency consents after consultation. No lawyer in a firm 
with which tttat lawyer is associated may knowingly under* 
take or continue representation in such a matter unless: 
(1) The disqualified lawyer is screened from any partacrpi-
tion in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee 
therefrom; and 
(2) Written notice is promptly given to the appropriat* 
government agency to enable it to ascertain compliance with 
the provisions of this Rule. 
(b) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer 
having information that the lawyer knows is confidential 
government information about a person acquired when the 
lawyer was a public officer or employee may not represent i 
private client whose interests are adverse to that person in & 
matter in which the information could be used to the materiii 
disadvantage of that person, unless the appropriate govern-
ment client consents after consultation with the lawyer A firm 
with which that lawyer is associated may undertake or con-
tinue representation in the matter only if the disqualified 
lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is 
apportioned no part of the fee therefrom. 
(c) Excepn as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer 
serving as a public officer or employee shall not: 
(1) Participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated 
personally and substantially while in private practice or 
nongovernmental employment, unless under applicable liw 
no one is, or by lawful delegation may be, authorized to act in 
the lawyer's stead in the matter; or 
(2) Negotiate for private employment with any person wi» 
is involved as a party or as attorney for a party in a matter in 
which the lawyer is participating personally and substan-
tially, unless the appropnate government client consents after 
consultation with the lawyer. 
(d) As used in this Rule, the term "matter* includes 
(1) Any j udicial or other proceeding, application, request for 
a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy 
investigation, charge, accusation, arrest or other parncaisr 
matter involving a specific party or parties; and 
(2) Any other matter covered by the conflict of interest roles 
of the appropriate government .agency. 
(e) As used in this Rule, the term "confidential govern©*** 
information'f means information which has been obtain** 
under governmental authority and which, at the time th* 
Rule is applied, the government is prohibited by la^JjDBX 
disclosing to the public or has a legal privilege not to discio* 
and which is not otherwise available to the public. 
Rule 1.12. Former judge or arbitrator. 
(a) Except as stated in paragraph (d), a lawyer shall a* 
represent, anyone in connection with a matter in whicn 
lawyer participated personally and substantially as aiu°f?
 § 
other adjudicative officer, arbitrator or law clerk to su«> 
person, unless ail parties to the proceeding consent' © ^ 
disclosure. 
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(b) A lawyer shall not negotiate for employment with any 
person who is involved as a party or as attorney for a party in 
a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and 
substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer or arbi-
trator. A lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other 
adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate for employ-
ment with a party or attorney involved in a matter in which 
the clerk is participating personally and substantially, but 
only after the lawyer has notified the judge, other adjudicative 
officer or arbitrator. 
(c) If a lawyer is disqualified by paragraph (a), no lawyer in 
a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly 
undertake or continue representation in the matter unless: 
(1) The disqualified lawyer is screened from any participa-
tion in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee 
therefrom; and 
(2) Written notice is promptly given to the appropriate 
tribunal to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provi-
sions of this Rule. 
(d) An arbitrator selected as a partisan of a party in a 
multimember arbitration panel is not prohibited from subse-
quently representing that party. 
Rule 1.13. Organization as a client. 
fa) A lawver employed or retained by an organization 
represents the organization acting through its duly authorized 
constituents. 
(b) If, in a matter related to the representation of an 
organization, a lawyer knows that an officer, employee or 
other person associated with the organization is engaged in, 
intends to engage in, or refuses to take action in violation of a 
legal obligation of the organization, or a violation of law that 
may reasonably be imputed to the organization, and is likely 
to result in substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer 
shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of 
the organization. In determining how to proceed, the lawyer 
shall give due consideration to the seriousness of the violation 
and its consequences, the scope and nature of the lawyer's 
representation, the responsibility in the organization and the 
apparent motivation of the person involved, the policies of the 
organization concerning such matters and any other relevant 
considerations. Any measures taken shall be designed to 
minimize disruption of the organization and the risk of reveal-
ing information relating to the representation to persons 
outside the organization, except as required by law or other 
rules of professional conduct. Such measures may include 
among others: 
(1) asking reconsideration of the matter; 
(2) advising that a separate legal opinion on the matter be 
sought for presentation to appropriate authority in the orga-
nization; and 
(3) referring the matter to higher authority in the organi-
zation, including, if warranted by the seriousness of tine 
matter, referral to the highest authority that can act in behalf 
of the organization as determined by applicable law. 
(c) If, despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with para-
graph (b), the highest authority that can act on behalf of tne 
organization insists upon action, or a refusal to act, that is 
clearly a violation of law and is likely to result in substantial 
injury to the organization, the lawyer has "good cause" tto 
resign or withdraw, as appropriate, under Rule 1.16(b)(6). 
(d) In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, 
employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, a 
lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when it iis 
apparent that the organization's interests are adverse to those 
of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing. 
(e) A lawyer representing an organization may also repre-
sent any of its directors, officers, employees, members, share-
holders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 
1.7. If the organization's consent to the dual representation is 
required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by a person or 
entity, other than the individual who is to be represented, 
properly authorized by the organization. 
(f) A lawyer elected, appointed, retained, or employed to 
represent a governmental entity shall be considered for the 
purpose of **»* rule as representing an organization. The 
government lawyer's client is the governmental entity except 
as the representation or duties are otherwise required by law. 
The responsibilities of the lawyer in paragraphs (b) and (c) 
may be modified by the duties required by law for the 
government lawyer. 
Rule 1.14. Client under a disability. 
(a) When a client's ability to make adequately considered 
decisions in connection with the representation is impaired, 
whether because of minority, mental disability or for some 
other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, 
Tpnintjiin a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client. 
(b) A lawyer may seek the appointment of a guardian or 
t»k* other protective action with respect to a client, only ""hen 
the lawyer reasonably believes that the client cannot ade-
quately act in the client's own interest. 
Rule 1.15. Safekeeping property. 
(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons 
that is in a lawyer's possession in connection with a represen-
tation separate from the lawyer's own property. Funds shall be 
kept in a separate account maintained in the state where the 
lawyer's office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the 
client or third person. The account may only be maintained in 
a financial institution which agrees to report to the Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel in the event any instrument in properly 
payable form is presented against an attorney trust account 
containing insufficient funds, irrespective of whether or not 
the instrument is honored. Other property shall be identified 
as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of 
such account funds and other property shall be kept by the 
lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five years after 
termination of the representation. 
(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client 
or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify 
the client or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or 
otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a 
lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any 
funds or other property that the client or third person is 
entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third 
person, shall promptly render a fall accounting regarding Buch 
property. 
(c) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in 
possession of property in which both the lawyer and another 
person claim interests, the property shall be kept separate by 
the lawyer until there is an accounting and severance of their 
interests. If a dispute arises concerning their respective inter-
ests, the portion in dispute shall be kept separate by the 
lawyer until the dispute is resolved. 
Rule 1.16. Declining or terminating representation. 
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client or, where represen-
tation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representa-
tion of a client if: 
(1) The representation will result in violation of the Rules 
of Professional Conduct or other law; 
(2) The lawyer's physical or mental condition materially 
impairs the lawyer's ability to represent the client; or 
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(3) The lawyer is discharged. 
(b) A lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if 
withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse 
effect on the interests of the client or if: 
(1) The client persists in a course of action involving the 
lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is crim-
inal or fraudulent; 
(2) The client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a 
crime or fraud; 
(3) A client insists upon pursuing an objective that the 
lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent; 
(4) The client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to 
the lawyer regarding the lawyer's services and has been given 
reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the 
obligation is fulfilled; 
(5) The representation will result in an unreasonable finan-
cial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably 
difficult by the client; or 
(6) Other good cause for withdrawal exists. 
(c) This Rule is not violated by a lawyer who continues 
representation when ordered to do so by a tribunal, notwith-
standing good cause for terminating the representation. 
(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take 
steps to the extent reasonably pracncaDle to protect a client'3 
interests, sucn as giving reasonaDle notice to the client, 
allowing time tor employment of other counsel, surrendering 
papers and property to whicn the client is entitled and 
refunding any aavance payment of fee that has not been 
earned. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to 
the extent permitted by other law, but must provide, upon 
request, the client's file to the client The lawyer may repro-
duce and retain copies of the client file at the lawyer'a expense. 
lawyer shall not continue to represent any of the Cucaia i 
matter that was the subject of the intermediation. 
Rule ZZ. Evaluation for use by third per?™-
(a) A lawyer may undertake an eval ^ 
affecting a client for the use of someone other than the diem 
i£ 
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes that TT...»..,5 W ^n^ 
ation is compatible with other aspects of the lawyer's relation, 
ship with the client; and 
(2) The client consents after consultation. 
(b) Except as disclosure is required in connection witk * 
report of an evaluation, information relating to the evaluation 
is otherwise protected by Rule 1.6. 
ADVOCATE 
Rule 3.1. Meritorious claims and contention] 
A lawyer shall not bnng or defend a proceeding, or assert or 
controvert an issue therein, unless then* is a basis for doing so 
that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for 
an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer 
for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent 
in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may never* 
theless 30 defend '-he proceeding as to require that every 
element of the case oe estaolished. 
Rule 3.2. Expe<liting litigation. 
A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation 
consistent with the interests of the client. 
COUNSELOR 
Rule 2.1. Advisor. 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent 
professional judgment and render candid aavice. In rendering 
advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law out to other 
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political 
factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation. 
Rule 2.2. Intermediary. 
(a) A lawyer may act as intermediary between clients if: 
(1) The lawyer consults with each client concerning the 
implications of the common representation, including the 
advantages and risks involved, and the effect of the antorney-
client privileges, and obtains each client's conseat to the 
common representation; and 
(2) The lawyer reasonably believes that the mattssr can be 
resolved on terms compatible with the client's best interest, 
that each client will be able to make adequately informed 
decisions in the matter and that there is little risk of ^natenal 
prejudice to the interests of any of the clients if the? contem-
plated resolution is unsuccessful; and 
13) The lawyer reasonably believes that the common repre-
sentation can be undertaken impartially and witlhout im-
proper effect on other responsibilities the iawyer has- to any of 
the clients; and 
(4) All requirements of Rules 1.7 and 1.8 are mek. 
(b) While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shaiil consult 
with each client concerning the decisions to be made* and the 
considerations relevant in making them, so that aasch client 
can maKe adequately informed decisions. 
»c; A iawyer snail withdraw as intermediary tf amy of the 
clients 30 reouests, or if any of the conditions sitated in 
paragrapn aj is ao longer satisfied. Upon withdrawal, the 
Rule 3.3. Candor toward the tribunal. 
(a) A lawyer snail not knowingly: 
(1) Make a false statement of material fact or law "to a 
tribunal; 
12) Fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when 
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraud-
ulent act by the ciient; 
(3) Fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in me 
controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly 
adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed br 
opposing counsel: or 
(4) Offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false, u a 
lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of iti 
falsity, the lawyer 3hail take reasonable remedial measures. 
(b) The duties 3tated in paragraph (a) continue to tb 
conclusion of title proceeding, and apply even if complianc* 
requires disclosure of information otherwise protected *— 0,,1< 
1.6. 
(c) A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer 
reasonably believes is false. 
(d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform u»" 
tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer which wul 
enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether <s 
not the facts are adverse. 
Rule 3.4. Fairness to opposing party and counsel 
A lawyer shall not: 
(a) Unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence 
or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or °*k^J, 
material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer ^ ^ 
not counsel or assist another person to do any such act; " . 
lb) Falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to t e s ^ J 
falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited 
by law; 
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(c) Knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a 
tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that 
no valid obligation exists; 
(d) In pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery re-
quest or fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with 
a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party; 
(e) In trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not 
reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by 
admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in 
issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal 
opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a 
witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or 
innocence of an accused; or 
(f) Request a person other than a client to refrain from 
voluntarily giving relevant information to another party un-
less: 
(1) The person is a relative or an employee or other agent of 
a client; and 
(2) The lawyer reasonably believes that the person's inter-
ests will not be adversely affected by refraining from giving 
such information. 
Rule 3.5. Impartiality and decorum of the tribunal 
A lawyer shall not* 
(a) Seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or 
other official by means prohibited by law; or 
(b) Communicate ex parte with a juror or prospective juror 
before the discharge of the jury except as permitted by law; or 
ic) In an adversary proceeding, communicate, or cause 
another to communicate, as to the merits of the cause with a 
judge or other official before whom a matter is pending, except: 
(1) In the course of official proceedings in the cause; 
(2) In writing if the lawyer promptly delivers a copy of the 
writing to opposing counsel or to the adverse party if such 
party is not represented by a lawyer; 
(3) Orally upon adequate notice to opposing counsel or to 
the adverse party if such party is not represented by a lawyer; 
or 
(4) As otherwise authorized by law; or 
(d) Engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal. 
Rule 3.6. Trial publicity. 
(a) A lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement that 
a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by 
means of public communication if the lawyer knows or rea-
sonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood 
of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the 
matter. 
(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) a lawyer may state: 
(1) the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when 
prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved; 
(2) information contained m a public record; 
(3) that an investigation of a matter is in progress; 
(4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation; (5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and 
information necessary thereto; 
(6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person 
involved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the 
likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public 
interest; and 
(7) in a criminal case, m addition to subparagraphs (1) through (6): 
d) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused; 
(u) if the accused has not been apprehended, information 
necessary to aid in apprehension of that person; 
(in) the fact, time and place of arrest; and 
(hr) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or 
agencies and the length of the investigation. 
(c) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may make a 
statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required 
to protect a client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect 
of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyers 
client. A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be 
limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the 
recent adverse publicity. 
Rule 3.7. Lawyer as witness. 
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial m which the 
lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness except where: 
(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue; 
(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal 
services rendered in the case; or 
(3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial 
hardship on the client 
(b) A lawyer may act as advocate in the trial in which 
another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a 
witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9. 
Rule 3 A Special responsibilities of a prosecutor. 
The prosecutor m a criminal case shall. 
(a) Refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor 
knows is not supported by probable cause; 
(b) Make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has 
been advised of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, 
counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain 
counsel; 
(c) Not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a 
waiver of important pretrial rights, such as the right to a 
preliminary hearing; 
(d) Make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or 
information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the 
guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection 
with sentencing, disclose to the defense all unprivileged mit-
igating information known to the prosecutor, except when the 
prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective 
order of the tribunal; and 
(e) Exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators, law 
enforcement personnel, employees or other persons assisting 
or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from 
making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would 
be prohibited from making under Rule 3.6. 
Rule 3.9. Advocate in nonadjudicative proceedings. 
A lawyer representing a client before a legislative or admin-
istrative tribunal in a nonadjudicative proceeding shall dis-
close that the appearance is m a representative capacity and 
shall conform to the provisions of Rules 3.3(a) through (c), 
3.4(a) through (c), and 3.5. 
TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS OTHER THAN 
CLIENTS 
Rule 4.1. Truthfulness in statements to others. 
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not 
knowingly* 
(a) Make a false statement of material fact or law to a third 
person; or 
(b) Fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when 
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraud-
ulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 
1.6. 
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Rule 42. Communication with person represented by 
counsel* 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate 
about the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer 
knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, 
unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is 
authorized by law to do so. This rule does not apply to 
communications with government parties unless litigation 
about the subject of the representation is pending or immi-
nent. Communications with elected officials are permissible 
when litigation is pending or imminent after disclosure of the 
representation to the official. 
Rule 4*3. Dealing with unrepresented person. 
(a) During the course of a lawyer's representation of a 
client, the lawyer shall not give advice to an unrepresented 
person other than the advice to obtain counsel. 
(b) In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not 
represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that 
the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or rea-
sonably should know that the unrepresented person misun-
derstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall 
make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding. 
Rule 4.4. Respect for rights of third persons. 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that 
have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or 
burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence 
that violate the legal rights of such a person. 
LAW FIRMS AND ASSOCIATIONS 
Rule 5.1. Responsibilities of a partner or supervisory 
lawyer. 
(a) A partner in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to 
ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable 
assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 
(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over an-
other lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the 
other lawyer conforms to the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's vio-
lation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if: 
(1) The lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific 
conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or 
(2) The lawyer is a partner in the law firm in which the 
other lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory authonty 
over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time 
when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to 
take reasonable remedial action. 
Rule 5.2. Responsibilities of a subordinate lawyer. 
(a) A lawyer is bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct 
notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of 
another person. 
(b) A subordinate lawyer does not violate the Rules of 
Professional Conduct if that lawyer acts in accordance with a 
supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of a question of 
professional duty. 
Rule 5.3. Responsibilities regarding nonlawyer assis-
tants. 
With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or 
associated with a lawyer 
(a) A partner in a law firm shall make reasonable eff 
ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving rea*»*w? 
assurance that the person's conduct is compatible^mhTiZ 
professional obligations of the lawyer, 
(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over t3w 
nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that tkl 
person's conduct is compatible with the professional oblijrZ 
taons of the lawyer, and 
(c) A lawyer 3hall be responsible for conduct of such 
person that would be a violation of the Rules of Profeama^ 
Conduct if engaged m by a lawyer if: 
(1) The lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the speafU 
conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or 
(2) The lawyer is a partner m the law firm in which tf* 
person is employed, or has direct supervisory authonty o w 
the person, and knows of the conduct at a time when it» 
consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take 
reasonable remedial action. 
Rule 5.4. Professional independence of a lawyer. 
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a 
nonlawyer, except that. 
(1) An agreement by a lawyer with the lawyers firm, 
partner, or associate may provide for the payment of money, 
over a reasoriaDle period of time after the lawyer's nooth, to 
the lawyer's estate or to one or more specified persons; 
(2) A lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished legal 
business of a deceased lawyer may pay to the estate of the 
deceased lawyer that proportion of the total compensation 
which fairly represents the services rendered by the deceased 
lawyer, and 
(3) A lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees 
in a compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is 
based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement. 
(b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer 
if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice 
of law. 
(c) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, 
employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services 5* 
another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judg-
ment in rendering sucn legal services. 
(d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a 
professional corporauon or associauon authorized to practice 
law for a profit, if: 
( D A nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a 
fiduciary representauve of the estate of a lawyer may hold the 
stock or interest of the lawyer for a reasonable time during 
administration. 
(2) A nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof; or 
(3) A nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the 
professional judgment of a lawyer. 
(e) A lawyer may practice m a non-profit corporation which 
is established to serve the public interest provided that the 
nonlawyer directors and officers of such corporauon do not 
interfere with the independent professional judgment of the 
lawyer. 
Rule 5.5. Unauthorized practice of law. 
A lawyer snail not: 
(a) Practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the 
regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction: or 
(b) Assist any person in the performance of activity that 
constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. 
Rule 5.6. Restrictions on right to practice. 
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making: 
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(a) A partnership or employment agreement that restricts 
the rights of a lawyer to practice after termination of the 
relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon 
retirement; or 
(b) An agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's 
right to practice is part of the settlement of a controversy 
between private parties. 
PUBLIC SERVICE 
Rule 6.1. Pro bono publico service. 
A lawyer should render public interest legal service. A 
lawyer may discharge this responsibility by providing profes-
sional services at no fee or a reduced fee to persons of limited 
means or to public service or charitable groups or organiza-
tions, by service in activities for improving the law, the legal 
system or the legal profession, and by financial support for 
organizations that provide legal services to persons of limited 
means. 
Rule 6.2. Accepting appointments. 
A lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal 
to represent a person except for good cause, such as: 
(a) Representing the client is likely to result in violation of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law; 
(b) Representing the client is likely to result in an unrea-
sonable financial burden on the lawyer; or 
(c) The client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as 
to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship of the 
.awyer's ability to represent the client. 
Rule 6.3. Membership in legal services organization. 
A lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of a legal 
services organization, apart from the law firm in which the 
lawyer practices, notwithstanding that the organization 
serves persons having interests adverse to a client of the 
lawyer. The lawyer shall not knowingly participate in a 
decision or action of the organization: 
(a) If participation in the decision would be incompatible 
with the lawyer's obligations to a cheat under Rule 1.7; or 
(b) Where the decision could have a material adverse effect 
on the representation of a client of the organization whose 
interests are adverse to a client of the lawyer, or on the 
representation of a client of the lawyer or the lawyer's firm. 
Rule 6.4. Law reform activities affecting client inter-ests. 
A lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of an 
organization involved in reform of the law or its administra-
tion notwithstanding that the reform may affect the interests 
of a client of the lawyer. When the lawyer knows that the 
interests of a client may be materially benefitted by a decision 
in which the lawyer participates, the lawyer shall disclose that 
fact but need not identify the client. 
INFORMATION ABOUT LEGAL SERVICES 
Rule 7.1. Communications concerning a lawyer's ser-
vices. 
A lawyer shall not mak* a false or misleading communica-
tion about the lawyer or the lawyer's services. A communica-
tion is false or misleading if it: 
(a) Contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or 
omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered aa a 
whole not materially misleading; 
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(b) Is likely to create an unjustified expectation about 
results the lawyer can achieve, or states or implies that the 
lawyer can achieve results by means that violate the Rules of 
Professional Conduct or other law; or 
(c) Compares the lawyer's services with other lawyers' 
services, unless the comparison can be factually substanti-
ated. 
Role 7.2. Advertising. 
(a) Subject to the requirements of Rules 7.1 and 7.3, a 
lawyer may advertise services through public media, such as a 
telephone directory, legal directory, newspaper or other peri-
odical, outdoor advertising, radio or television, or through 
written or recorded communication. 
(b) A copy or recording of an advertisement or written 
communication shall be kept for two years after its last 
dissemination along with a record of when and where it was 
used. 
(c) A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for 
recommending the lawyer's services, except that a lawyer may 
pay the reasonable cost of advertising or written communica-
tion permitted by this Rule and may pay the usual charges of 
a not-for-profit lawyer referral service or other legal service 
organization. 
(d) Any communication made pursuant to this Rule shall 
include the name of at least one lawyer responsible for its 
content 
Role 7.3. Direct contact with prospective clients. 
(a) A lawyer may not solicit, ln-person, professional employ-
ment from a prospective client with whom the lawyer has no 
family or pnor professional relationship, when a significant 
motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyers pecuniary gain. 
The term "in-person" includes m-person and telephonic com-
munication directed to a specific recipient, but does not 
include letters addressed or advertising circulars distributed 
generally to persons not known to need legal services of the 
kind provided by the lawyer in a particular matter, but who 
are so situated that they might in general find such services 
useful. 
(b) A lawyer may not solicit, by mail or other written 
communication directed to a specific recipient concerning a 
specific cause of action, professional employment from a 
prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family or prior 
professional relationship under the following circumstances: 
(1) The lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the 
physical, emotional or mental state of the person is such that 
the person could not exercise reasonable judgment in employ-
ing a lawyer; 
(2) The person has made known to the lawyer a desire not 
to receive communications from the lawyer; or 
(3) The communication involves coercion, duress, or harass-
ment 
Rule 7.4. Communication of fields of practice. 
A lawyer may communicate the fact that the lawyer will 
accept employment in specified areas of practice. A lawyer 
whose practice is limited to specified areas of practice may 
communicate that fact. A lawyer shall not hold himself out 
publicly as a specialist and shall not indicate any certification 
or designation as a specialist, except as follows: 
(a) A lawyer admitted to practice before the United States 
Patent and Trademark office may use the designation "patent 
attorney or a substantially similar designation; and 
(b) In accordance with any plan regulating lawyer special-
ization approved and promulgated by the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
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Rule 7.5. Firm names and letterheads. 
(a) A lawyer shall not use a firm name, letterhead or other 
professional designation that violates Rule 7.1. A trade j)*™* 
may be used by a lawyer in private practice if it does not imply 
a connection with a government agency or with a public or 
charitable legal services organization and is not otherwise in 
violation of Rule 7.1. 
(b) A law firm with offices in more than one jurisdiction may 
use the same name in each jurisdiction, but identification of 
the lawyers in an office of the firm shall indicate the jurisdic-
tional limitations on those not licensed to practice in the 
jurisdiction where the office is located. 
(c) The name of a lawyer holding a public office shall not be 
used in the name of a law firm, or in communications on its 
behalf, during any substantial period in which the lawyer is 
not actively and regularly practicing with the firm. 
(d) Lawyers may state or imply that they practice in a 
partnership or other organization only when that is the fact. 
MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF THE PROFESSION 
Rule 8.1. Bar admission and disciplinary matters. 
An applicant for admission to the Bar, or a lawyer in 
connection with a Bar admission application or in connection 
with a disciplinary matter, shall not: 
(a) Knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or 
Ob) Fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misappre-
hension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or 
knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information 
from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this 
Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise 
protected by Rule 1.6. 
(a) Violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Profestuaw. 
Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do %* 
through the acts of another, 
(b) Commit a criminal act that reflects adversely QQ g^ 
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer m 
other respects; 
(c) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraua, deceit or 
misrepresentation; 
(d) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the sdzninistr*. 
tion of justice; 
(e) State or imply an ability to influence improperr* • 
government agency or official; 
(f) Knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct 
that is a violation of applicable Rules of Judicial Conduct » 
other law, or 
(g) Engage in sexual relations with a client that exploit the 
lawyer-client relationship. For purposes of this subdivision: 
(1) "Sexual relations" means sexual intercourse or the 
touching of an intimate part of another person for the purpose 
of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse; and 
(2) Except for a spousal relationship or a sexual relation-
ship that existed at the commencement of the lawyer-client 
relationship, se:cual relations between a lawyer and a cheat 
shall be presumed to be exploitative. This presumption it 
rebuttable. 
Rule 8J5. Jurisdiction. 
A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject 
to the disciplinary authonty of this jurisdiction although 
engaged in practice elsewhere. 
CHAPTER 14. RULES OF LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND 
DISABILITY 
Rule &2. Judicial officials, 
(a) A lawyer shall not make a public statement that the 
lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its 
truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a 
judge, adjudicatory officer, or of a candidate for election or 
appointment to judicial office. 
(b) A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office shall 
comply with the applicable provisions of the Code of Judicial 
Conduct. 
Rule 8JJ. Reporting professional misconduct. 
(a) A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has 
committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall 
inform the appropriate professional authonty. 
(b) A lawyer having knowledge that a judge has committed 
a violation of the applicable Rules of Judicial Conduct that 
raises a substantial question as to the judge's fitness for office 
shall inform the appropriate authority. 
(c) This Rule does not require disclosure of information 
otherwise protected by Rule 1.6. 
(d) This rule does not require disclosure of information 
provided to or discovered by members of the Utah State Bar 
during the course of their work on the Lawyers Helpmg 
Lawyers Committee, a committee which has as its purpose the 
counseling of other bar members about substance abuse or 
psychological or emotional problems. 
Rule 8.4. Misconduct. 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
Summary. 
Rule 
1. Purpose, authonty, scope and stricture of lawyer disciplin-
ary and disability proceedings. 
2. Definitions. 
3. Ethics and discipline committee. 
4. Disciplinary counsel. 
5. Expenses. 
6. Jurisdiction. 
7. Roster of lawyers. 
8. Penodic assessment of lawyers. 
9. Grounds for discipline. 
10. Prosecution and appeals. 
11. Proceeding subsequent to finding of probable cause. 
12. Sanctions 
13. Immunity 
14. Service. 
15. Access to disciplinary information. 
16. Dissemination of disciplinary information. 
17. Additional rules of procedure. 
18. Interim suspension for threat of harm. 
19. Lawyers convicted of a cnme. 
20. Discipline; by consent. 
21. Resignation with discipline pending. 
22. Reciprocal discipline. 
23. Proceedings m which lawyer is declared to be incompcten 
or alleged to be incapacitated. * 
24. Reinstatement following a suspension of six xnontns 
less. -
 gsx 
25. Reinstatement following a suspension of more than 
months; re admission. 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Von Lester TAYLOR, Defendant and Appellant 
No. 910496. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct 24,1997 
Defendant pled guilty to capital murder and was sentenced to death, by the District Court, Coalville Department. Frank 
G. Noel. J. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court Durham. J., held that. (1) trial counsel did not provide ineffective 
assistance by misinforming defendant about likelihood of preventing evidence regarding dropped charges from entering 
into penalty phase of homicide prosecution; (2) defense counsel did not have conflict of interest based on philosophy of 
role of defense counsel, (3) defense counsel conducted adequate mitigation investigation: (4) defense counsel did not 
have conflict of interest based on minimal compensation; and (5) defense counsel's closing argument was adequate. 
Affirmed. 
Stewart, Associate C J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
[1] CRIMINAL LAW <@=*1158(1) 
110kll58(l) 
Supreme Court defers to trial court's findings of fact after hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel claim. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 6; Rules App.Proc., Rule 23B. 
[2] CRIMINAL LAW <©=*641.13(1) 
110k641.13(l) 
Supreme Court reviews ineffective assistance of counsel claims under two-part analysis: defendant must demonstrate 
that counsel's performance fell below objective standard of reasonableness; and defendant must show that absent 
counsel's errors, he had reasonable chance to prevail, and thus errors undermine confidence m outcome. U.S.CA. 
Const Amend. 6. 
[31 CRIMINAL LAW <§=*641.13(1) 
110k641.13(l) 
When reviewing counsel's performance, on ineffective assistance of counsel claim, court must indulge strong 
presumption counsel's conduct falls within wide range of reasonable professional assistance. U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 6. 
(41 CRIMINAL LAW <®=>641.13(5) 
110k641.13(5) 
Trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by misinforming defendant about likelihood of preventing evidence 
regardmg dropped charges from entering into penalty phase of homicide prosecution, evidence supported finding that 
counsel correctly mformed defendant about scope of penalty phase, at plea hearing defendant heard prosecution say it 
intended to introduce evidence of dismissed charges and defense counsel objected, and defendant twice told court during 
plea proceedings that he was satisfied with counsel's performance. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
[51 CRIMINAL LAW <®=>1158(1) 
110kll58(l) 
Tnal court's findings of fact are "clearly erroneous" when they are against clear weight of evidence. 
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and definitions. 
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[6] CRIMINAL LAW <®=>64U3(H) 
110k641.13(2.1) 
^ m S S S S K ^ J ? °! ? f a X "** M not « * * wtth his dutv to represent defendant in 
[61 CRIMINAL LAW <S=»641.13(5) 
110k641.13(5) 
^ X S ^ " J ? °f * * « « " * « «* « « t o " * ^  duty to represent defendant » 
[7] CRIMINAL LAW <@=641.5( 5) 
110k641.5(5) 
Right to counsel encompasses nght to counsel free from conflicts of interest. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6 
[8j CRIMINAL LAW <®=>641.5(.5) 
110k641.5(.5) 
[91 CRIMINAL LAW <®=>641.5(.5) 
^^^tT^^z^^f^t* r^of °°rL d-tatat ***danons,rate -
clients interests. U.S.C A. C o i ^ ^ I 6. ^ ^ "* ^ 0Wtt mtCreStS to detnment o f *» 
[10J CRIMINAL LAW <S=>641.5(.5) 
110k641.5(.5) 
Once defendant demmar.^ »**nil cmflfr-t th^ • i i. 
slanabaaednpoa alleged conflict o r ^ ^ E ^ ^ ^ ^ l *"***' " "'***" 3S*SlmX ° f " ^ 
[111 CRIMINAL LAW <S=641.13rn 
U0k641.13(7) 
was no 
[121 CRIMINAL LAW <©=»641.13ro 
110k641.13(7) 
of thTdiuTp^lT PlCd ^ t 0 a CaPlUl " " ^ dcf6nSe Counsel has ±e so le dnty o f tiymg to prevent the unposition 
[13J CRIMINAL LAW <®»641.13(7> 
110k641.13(7) 
Defense attorneys must adequately investiffiite all n^—, iu 
sentencmg phase where defendant Z P S ^ ^ ^ 
anoraey can reasonably rule out noitiga J g factoTu.^cTSn^end' 6 mVCSdgaU°n * DOt K<{m&L where 
[141 CRIMINAL LAW «s»«41.13(7) 
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110k641.13(7) 
Defense counsel must investigate potential mitigation by mental disease or extreme mental disturbance, in sentencing 
phase of capital prosecution, where defendant claims to have suffered from mental illness at time of crime or to have 
suffered serious mental illness previously U.S.C.A. ConstAmend 6. 
[15] CRIMINAL LAW <®=*641.13(7) 
110k641.13(7) 
Attorney does not have obligation to introduce mitigating evidence in sentencing phase of capital prosecution, if she 
believes after thorough investigation that it will harm the case or if other strategic reasons for its omission exist. 
U.SC.A. Const Amend. 6 
[16] CRIMINAL LAW <§=>641.13(7) 
110k641.13(7) 
Failure to investigate mitigating factors in sentencing phase of criminal prosecution can constitute ineffective assistance 
of counsel only where such factors actually exist and may be productively uscxi m penalty phase. U S C.A. 
Const. Amend. 6. 
[17] CRIMINAL LAW <®^>641.5(.5) 
110k641.5(.5) 
Defense counsel did not have conflict of interest, in capital murder prosecution, based upon fact that he received only 
minimal compensation; defendant failed to present evidence that his defense suffered, and counsel had substantial 
income from other sources. U.S.C A. ConstAmend. 6. 
[18] CRIMINAL LAW <®=»641.13(2.1) 
110k641.13(2.1) 
Capital murder defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel based on defense counsel's closing argument: 
although minimal, argument was reasonable. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
[19] CRIMINAL LAW <@=*641.13(1) 
110k641.13(l) 
For purposes of ineffective assistance of counsel claim, attorney's performance need only be reasonable, and range of 
reasonableness is broad. U S.C A. ConstAmend. 6 
*683 Jan Graham, Atty. Gen.. J. Frederic Voros. Ji., Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert W Adkins, Coalville, Tern' L. 
Christiansen. Park City, for plaintiff and appellee. 
J. Bruce Savage. Park City, for defendant and appellant. 
DURHAM. Justice: 
We hear this appeal from a capital conviction pursuant to section 78- 2-2(3)(i) of the Utah Code. Defendant Von Lester 
Taylor pled guilty to two counts of capital murder m 1991. After a sentencing hearing, the jury returned two verdicts 
imposing the death sentence. Taylor appealed the sentence and subsequently fired bis attorney, Elliot Levme. Taylor 
mamtamed his appeal with new counsel assertmg claims of inadequate representation at tnaL In 1994, when the matter 
came before this court the first tune, we remanded it to die tnal court to hold a rule 23B hearmg on the mefiective 
assistance of counsel claims and collateral claims. We now have the results of that hearmg and treat all issues raised in 
the appeal. 
The facts of the underlying cranes are as follows: In December 1990. Taylor left a halfway house where he was 
housed while on parole after imprisonment for aggravated burglary Subsequently, Taylor and Edward Steven Dek 
broke into the Tiede family cabm near Beaver Springs. Utah, while the Tiedes were m Salt Lake City Once in the 
cabm. Taylor called a friend and told him that he intended "to shoot some people." Shortly *684 thereafter, Mrs. Tiede 
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Tiede and her mother Whe^MR l l e^s frndJT l ^ "* ^ conf ron tcd *** w t h V**> «d Taylor shot Mrs 
worshiped the deviL Later that afternoon. Mr T S ? . « T A ^ T a y l ° r to ld h c r rt WouId d o n o S00*1 ^ ^ ** 
heldMr Tiede at gun p o m t , s t o l e 7 i ? ^ *&*•«* 
twice After trymg to set fire to Mr Tiede m e W ™ ? * ' h m m , h ° face ™* b n d snot « ^ once and possibly 
car, taking the two Tiede daughters with ihem n , 8 m g B ' T*y,OT a a d D e h fled by snowmobile and then by 
survived the attack ^ ^ P 0 ^ appended Taylor and Deh later that day Mr Tiede 
respond to an office* s ^ l t o ^ ^ g r a t j ^ T ? ^ J ^ «*"" " ^ * * M™* 
criminal homicide, the State dropped the ofcerX^L X ' ^ l° p k a d ^ ^ to ** ^ c o u n t s o f 
This appeal raises only the issues addressed at the ml* MI*i. 
provided ineffective assistance of counsel and L A ^ T . ^ T * * ' w t a t a r Tay ,o r , s " " ^ attomey> Levme. 
findmgmeffectrveassume*«o^mi2£Sf^*"0Ute°me T a y l o r a s s e r t s m u l b P l e ^ f o r 
Plead guilty when he would not omerwise h a v T d T e T f ^ *"? t f *" * * * ° f a ^ P I ea"whwh Ied ^ to 
conflicted with his duty to represent Tavlor and caSedT-vT? ' ? ^ * " * *° role ° f * ' d e & M e attoraey 
compensation Levine received for Tavlor's TCZJTT ^ 1 P *** g m l t y mvobn^iy> and (3) the minimal 
assistance of counsel Taylor also s u g g e ^ s Z t t T E ^ " " " j f^*" ° f mtCrest ^ " ^ 8 Tay lor * • » * * * 
phase, rendenng the sentence arbitrary and ca^ ncTouI " " " ^ " ^ m cumuIa t Ive «w at *e penalty 
Tavlor's pamcipadon in 4 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ * ^ * ° P*™**1011 ^ P"*»ted overwhelming evuknee of 
- -a- and the aggravated kidnapmgs and a ^ h ^ S " " ^ " " i ** mWda*' mul t IP l e P*** s a w ^ tempted 
hostages The tnal court also found. c ^ h Z L'ZZZJT* aPPrehended Tay'<* as Taylor fled the crime scene with 
would exclude evidence of the enmes f b T X h ^ ^ ^ 
present the court explicitly stated that it would h L T ™ ? J*"} ^ ^ D u r m g p lea *scussions, with Tavlor 
charges at the penalty phase Levme had Z Z 5 ? 7 ? °S* e ^ a ™ * o f * • evidence relevant to the dropped 
pressure Tavlor to plead gmlty Taylor o K S , t l ^ ' ^ , 0 ^ " * a d v i s e d TayIor t0 *> *>> * did not 
«««^ ««nd^ tadKi J ^ ; t ^ ! J 2 ^ he **not want to put ^ famly•**e « • -
With regard to Levine's "ohilosonhv" ** #«.I 
which conflicted with h . role as a d e L T 2 " ~
 T T* * * m ta c Iosm* " I ™ * L " » did assert a position 
admit their gmlt and take the appropnate pumshm^r w TT^LeVmC dCSCnbed ^ role M heIPm8 defendants 
23B heanng mat his real b e h e f T i W S S S l J ^ ^ ** C 0 " t b 8 t a w d L e v m e ' s testm<™ •« *e "He 
thejurv's trust and encourage itsTen^enT t l l f " " ^ f! ^ IBd ^ h e m a d e ^ statements at tnal to gamer 
encouraged him to plead guilty The court „1 J f i S ^ V* M e d to p r o v , d e " ^ ^dence that Levine actuallv 
witlun the broad range of reasonable P r o f e s s i o ^ X ^ ^ u r y ^ " "* ™*° ^ beC™ rt ™ 
under a contract w«h t Z S ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ? ^ 4 e ^ ^ f ^ d that Levme served as Taylor's lawyer 
$24,000 As me legal defender for me
 c ^ ^ i d / f ^ T V , C e S F o r ^ ° y e a" °^ ^ « s , I ^ e recced 
Levme also mamtamed a private practice that d Z ! frfended chents
 m various courts and pursued habeas chums 
percent of ms gross income Levme soent ^^ZJ™ ^ ^ h e " P 1 ^ ^ Taylor, provided eighty to ninety 
on the Taylor *685 case He spent m l j ^ ^ ^ ' ^ f ^ 1 o f ^ *» ^ ^ January and May 1991 
tnal court found that money did not m a t t e r ^ e v m e ^ d ^ C°DSUltaTJ " * T a V ' ° r md m± T ^ s P 4 ^ ^ The 
o i^vme and that his income did not affect his decisions m this case 
One of Taylor's claims is mat Levme cho<»
 nnt • 
farther exams would prove fruitless and fc?„ S 01™^°? ""* ° f T a y l o r b e c a u s e L e v m e ^ught 
disclosed to the jury, hurting Tavlor^ s case ^ « ^ Z ^ T e d ,0 dC tCnnme samty " ^ ^Petencv would be 
« lUe reports from the previous exams mcluded mformation regarding 
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Taylor's interests in Satanism and witchcraft as well as previous drug abuse One of the psychological evaluations did 
say that Taylor showed signs of antisocial personality disorder with schizoid personality features, but Levme determined 
that the negative information about Taylor's character and behavior would offset anv potential benefit froin suggesting 
the existence of a personality disorder The court found that Levme's decision to omit mental health testimony fell 
within the broad range of reasonable professional judgment Levme did not obtain Taylors school record's but did ask 
Tavlor about his school days Levme also failed to obtain Taylor's health records, his juvenile court records, and his 
familv's psychological records He did not interview Taylor's friends or family members other than his mother and 
father Taylor, on the other hani has failed to provide any evidence that if Levme had performed any of the suggested 
investigations, the outcome of the trial would have differed He does not even suggest what such investigation would 
have revealed and how the revelations would have unproved his position with the jury The court found that Levme s 
performance did not fall below the reasonableness threshold 
[1][2][3] We defer to a trial court's findings of fact after a rule 23B hearing State v Huggms, 920 P 2d 1195, 1198 
(Utah Ct App 1996) From diese facts, we must decide whether Taylor received ineffective assistance of counsel in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. [FNl] See id. This court reviews Sixth 
Amendment ineffective assistance questions under a two-part analysis (1) The defendant must demonstrate that 
counsers performance " fell below an objective standard of reasonableness' ", and (2) he must show that absent 
counsel's errors, he had a reasonable chance to prevail, and thus the errors undermme confidence m the outcome State 
v Templm, 805 P 2d 182, 186-87 (Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland v Washington, 466 U S 668, 688.104 S.CL 2052, 
2064, 80 L £ d 2 d 674 (1984)). When reviewing counsel's performance, ' 'a court must indulge a strong presumption 
that counsel's conduct falls within die wide range of reasonable professional assistance " Id at 186 (quoting Strickland 
at 689 104 SCt at 2065) 
rN 1 Tavlor did not advance a claim under the Utah Constitution 
I MISINFORMATION ABOUT SCOPE OF PENALTY PHASE 
[4] Taylor claims that Levme specifically told him that the sentencing hearing would exclude all evidence about the 
dropped charges of attempted homicide, aggravated arson, aggravated kidnaping, aggravated robbeiv, theft etc Tavlor 
argues that the trial court's factual finding that Levme did not misinform Taylor about the likelihood of preventing this 
evidence from entering into the penalty phase was cleariv erroneous 
[5] We consider a trial court's findings of fact clearly erroneous *hen thev 'are against the clear weight of the 
evidence " State v Walker. 743 P 2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987) Evidence presented at the rale 23B hearing supports the 
finding diat Levme correctlv mfonned Taylor about the scope of the penaltv phase Levme testified that he told Tavlor 
that the penalty phase would resemble very closely a guilt phase but that Levme could possibly prevent the State from 
introducing certain inflammatory photographs as evidence. The transcript of the plea proceedings supports Levme's 
version and undermines Taylor's testimony to the contrary At the plea hearing, Tavlor heard the prosecution say that it 
intended to introduce evidence of the dismissed charges Levme registered his inteut to object to such evidence When 
asked by the court if he was satisfied with Levme's performance. Tavlor responded *686 affirmatively on two occasions 
during the plea proceedings Although the judge could have found Tavlor credible at the rule 23B heanng, he did not. 
and enough evidence supports die judge's finding to pievent us from holding it cleariv erroneous Hence;. Levme did not 
misinform Taylor or provide ineffective assistance of counsel m this manner 
n CONFLICT IN DEFENSE ROLE 
[6] [7] [3] [9] [10] Taylor claims tiiat Levme's philosophv about the role of a defense attornev conflicted with his dutv to 
represent Tavlor, resulting in an involuntarv guiltv plea and prejudicing the outcome of the penaltv piiase The ngnt to 
counsel encompasses ' rthe nght to counsel free trom conflicts of interest' * State v Webb, 790 P 2d 65. nl 
(Utah Ct App 1990) (quoting Strickland, 466 U S at 688L 104 S Ct at 2064), denial of habeas aff d sub nom bv Webb 
v Van Der Veur. 853 P 2d 898 (Utah Ct App 1993) and bv Webb v Van Der Veur 67 F 3d 312 (10th Cir 1995) 
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J^^^^^J^^^Z^ **2[the d:fendantl must *-**<as a 
of his client's interests • - I i ^ c V T ^ 7 ? ^ t 0 m a k e a cho icc •*"*»»«- ** own interests to the detriment i & t l " v"££. «SS ^ u i t ^ ^ i L " ^ 61£ft CV989) (eUips* m ongmaI)(qootog 
. no need to show prejudice Cuylei«ut5<>[ 100 S Ct a t 1 7 l ^ * ^ " ^ " " ^ * " 
^ ^ f ^ t t ? ^ £ ^ * f « F f—. -d igmdierecord .d i ca i e s that 
fact tned to discount h™ fi™T *? T , y , 0 r t mtCTeStS L e v m e never told Taylor to Plead g^tv «*»* 
of the guilty plea LdcexLT«L. * **?*** Confllct d o e s not ™dennme our confidence m the voluntanness 
strategytder^ e JX^^STf^ T? f ^ " *" JUiy argUment " " ^ a reaSOnable 
andjuLe w A a S S t o S i h J ^ ^ ^ e w a n t e d t o j * y t o s e e h m i a s a defense lawyer committed to tnrth 
ana justice, with a client who was honest and repentant and thus not deserving of the death penalty 
weigh the rmtigatmg f a c t o r I S T S T L ^ T " ™ 8 P V*1"*1 ^  m ^  *» faCt ^ m U S t 
cnxumstances outweigh u T n J t Z ^ ^ S ^ L ^ T " ? f ,*"? " f ^ ' * 1 aggraVatmg 
reasonable doubt Uun C o d T W ? T ^ r n ^ M b l e doubt m d ^ ^  peDaIty * "PP"*™* beyond a 
cireuriistancesmclude^ Wood; « « P 2 d 7 1 < « * I981> * " « • ""gating 
-xreme duress, mental d « S S S " " ^ " ^ i e X t r c m e " " ^ °f emO0OMl d l S t n i W -
format might mitigate the ^ X ^ C ^ ^ r ^ ! ^ ' ^ ^ " *" * " * ' "* ^ 
sentencins
 0h«T mSM-Z,T• K ^ * ^ f e a s c •*»*y». to P">vide effective assistance of counsel at the 
reasonably rule out a m t i ^ ^ r ^ ^ l T T ^ "»«*»«*> Nevertheless, where the attorney can 
available mitigatm* crrcuSZi ™ S ™, m v k e s t l 8 a t l o n » n<* «Pwd See id For example, one theoreticallv 
Code A ^ $ S J S T A T46, snbstantl«I domination" of me defendant by another *687 person Utah 
mental illness at the tune of the c r i m e ^ i ^ J T ^ S S "' ™beK ** defendant c l a m s t0 htw ^ ^ ftom 
potential mitigation T£Z S T S e ^ f ^ T T f r ' 1 ^ ^ P ^ ^ ' ^ att0niey mUSt mVeSd8ate 
oration to LJSZX^ilX^zz* T^T Nonethelf • *•attoracy **not have -
strategic reasons for rts omission exS 8 ^ 7 ^ 0 4 S a t t 'Sg"™ * * " " " ^  *" ^  " * ^ 
H o t ^ ^ t l ^ o o ^ o ^ T g a t t ° D ° f ta PSyCh0I081Ca, ^ m d - ^ 
o i s o r d e r . a n d s u b s t a n r a b u T L ^ ^ ^ * » • ^ — . a 1—ng 
examinations that had been perfomedSlti™ ^ f had 8CCeSS t0 both ° f m e P ^ ^ P c a l reports from the 
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investigation or another psychological exam. In other cases where failure to conduct a psychological exam has been 
held to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel the defendants had a history of senous mental illness and could show 
how an investigation would have furthered their defenses. See, e.g., Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 596-97 (5th 
Cir.1990) (subsequent history on other grounds omitted) (discussing various cases of ineffective assistance when 
attorney knew defendant had previously been hospitalized for mental illness). A defendant must show not only that 
counsel failed to seek mitigating evidence, but also that some actually existed to be found. Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 
523, 534 (11th Cir.1985) ("[Defendant] has adequately demonstrated a reasonable probabdity that he would have 
received a lesser sentence but for [attorney's] complete failure to search out mitigating character evidence. As the 
district court found, Tetitioner has demonstrated that no favorable evidence was sought and that some was in fact 
available.' " (quoting Blake v. Zant 513 F.Supp. 772 (S.D.Ga.1981))). Taylor has not suggested a helpful strategy that 
would have been supported by evidence not known to Levine. Failure to investigate mitigating factors can constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel only where such factors actually exist and may be productively used in the penalty 
phase. 
One of the problematic aspects of this case is the evolving nature of standards for adequate defense of a capital 
prosecution. The State appears to suggest in its bnef that an extensive mitigation workup or investigation may not 
always be necessary (apparently such investigations were not universally undertaken in Utah at the tone this case was 
tried). We are troubled by that proposition if it is intended to suggest that a less-than-adequate investigation will suffice. 
We hold here diat Levme's mitigation investigation, although very limited, appears to have been adequate; there are no 
indications that he overlooked anything useful m Taylor's background. We emphasize that the failure to perform an 
adequate mitigation workup represents ineffective assistance of counsel. To demonstrate that counsel made an 
unreasonable judgment m not pursuing an investigation further, a defendant must identify potentially mitigating 
circumstances that the investigation would have uncovered. See, e.g., Taylor v. Warden. 905 P.2d 277, 286 n. 6 (Utah 
1995) (holding that where defendant did not introduce psychological report containing potentially mitigating evidence at 
effectiveness hearing, court cannot make judgments about its contents). Defense attorneys need not present all evidence 
*688 uncovered by a mitigation workup, but they absolutely must perform one. 
m. CONFLICT OF INTEREST RESULTING FROM MINIMAL COMPENSATION 
[17] Taylor aiso suggests diat Levme's minimal compensation created a per se conflict of interest preventing him from 
giving Taylor adequate assistance of counsel. Taylor argues that flat fee compensation encourages lawyers to spend as 
little time on a case as possible and to promote plea bargains. We acknowledge that the problem of inadequate 
resources for defending capital cases creates significant potential for harm. [FN2] But Taylor has failed to allege, let 
alone identify, anything in diis particular case to support the theory that his defense suffered [FN3] At no tone did 
Levine 3ay, "We can't afford to have you psychologically tested," or anything of the kmd. Moreover, Levme personally 
had substantial mcome from other sources during die period he represented Taylor and knew he could obtam extra 
compensation from the county if needed. Taylor did not introduce any evidence regarding other demands on Levme's 
tone or point to inadequacies in the tone spent on this case. Without this information, we must accept the lower court's 
assessment that Levme's mcome and resources did not affect his strategy and efforts in this case. Hence, under the 
conflict of interest standard discussed in part II above, Tayior has failed to demonstrate an actual conflict of interest. 
FN2. Sec Douglas W Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services aid Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 Buff. 
L.Rev. 329 (Fall 1995). Poor compensation for capital defease attorneys appears to attract poor attorneys as evidenced by the rate 
of disciplinary action and disbarment for these attorneys tn various states. Id. at 398 ALJO, many capital defense attorneys lack 
general experience and have not received the training needed to defend a client in "one of the most specialized fields of practice in 
American iaw." Id. at 398-99 Furthermore, because of the minimal pay, attorneys often fail to spend the time needed to prepare 
for a case. Id. at 402-03. Insteaa. JI order to survive econowncaily, they must take on other cases that also demand time. Id. This 
ack of preparation becomes parnculariv apparent in sentencing proceedings where attomevs fail to present mitigating evidence 
that does exist. Id. at 403-04; see aiso Anthonv Paduano) & Clive A. Stafford Smith, ITic Unconscionabdity of Sub-Mmimum 
Wages Paid Appointed Counsel in Capital Cases. 43 Rutgeirs L.Rev. 281. 283 (1991) (exammmg whether statutorily set fees for 
capitai detense attomevs remunerate lawvers so poorrv that losing is more profitable than doing "everything possible to prevent a 
guiitv verdict and death sentence') 
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may already have made up their minds Oral argument builds on this base of information and attempts to operate on the 
hearts and minds of the jurors Persuasion depends greatly on the quality of the interpersonal dynamic between counsel 
and the juiy There are nuances to oral communication that cannot be reflected on tiie printed page Levme, havmg 
become acquainted with the jurors, may have decided that aggressive advocacy would liave alienated or offended them, 
he may have been convmced that a low- key, minimalist approach would elicit their sympathy We acknowledge that 
Levme's argument is so minimal as to represent the lower threshold of reasonableness and that if he had had any more to 
work with m the evidence or his client we might have reached another result Given the nature of the crime and 
substantial evidence against Taylor, however, even the finest ciosmg argument is not bkely to have saved him from the 
death penalty The few mitigating circumstances operating m this case fall well below the level needed to offset the 
vicious character of his crimes In our judgment the understatement of Levme's ciosmg argument did not lead to the 
death penalty for his client 
CONCLUSION 
As noted, Levme's representation of Taylor does not illustrate ideal defense attorney behavior Taylor, however, was 
not the ideal defendant Taylor voluntarily pled guilty to committing hemous crimes yrcthout provocation, and the State 
had irrefutable, detailed *690 evidence of those cranes The chances that Taylor would have fared any better had the 
best criminal defense attorney in the country made the perfect argument are slim Foir this reason, Taylor cannot show 
prejudice related to Levme's performance Similarly, with regard to his conflict of interest claims, Taylor failed to show 
an actual conflict The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
ZIMMERMAN C J, and HOWE and RUSSON, JJ, concur in Justice DURHAM'S opinion 
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice, dissenting 
There is no question that this case involves exceptionally wanton and hemous murders, and there is no question that 
defendant was the perpetrator Nevertheless, whether the death penalty should be imposed was a question to be decided 
solely by the juiy, but only after all the requisite legal procedures and requirements liad been complied with Defense 
counsel's failure to meet those requirements resulted m defendant's bemg denied the effective assistance of counsel as 
required by the Sixth Amendment Strickland v Washington. 466 U S 668, 104 S Ct 2052, 80 L Ed.2d 674 (1984), 
State v Templm, 805 P 2d 182 (Utah 1990) 
The majority opinion states that "[d]efense attorneys absolutely must perform" a "mitigation workup " That was not 
done in this case The majority opinion characterizes defense counsel's mitigation investigation as "very limited'' but 
"adequate " Id. I cannot agree that it was adequate Defense counsel did not conduct an m-depth mvesugation of 
defendant's psychological history and condition It is simply not sufficient that the attorney knew about some of 
defendant's childhood psychological problems, his learning disorder, and substance abuse in his family All those 
factors and possibly others that may have seriously affected defendant's character were simply not explored in anv 
meaningful way for the purpose of providing some evidence that would weigh in favor of a life sentence It may be that 
nothing would have come from an adequate mitigation workup that would have persuaded a jury to reach a different 
conclusion as to the appropriate penalty, but it is not possible to know what might have been discovered had defense 
counsel done his job 
Furthermore, defense counsel clearly should have been disqualified from representing defendant and any other capital 
defendant because of his failure to adhere to fundamental professional standards of competence and conduct See State 
v Holland. 876 P 2d 357 (Utah 1994) (discussing and disapproving defense counsel's personal approach and strategy in 
conducting defense of criminal cases), see also id at 361 (opinion of Stewart Assoc C J, & Durham, J) Indeed, 
defense counsel's ciosmg argument to the jury, to the extent it even addresses issues somewhat pertinent to the case, is 
more a self- justification of defense counsel than a plea that the jury impose a life sentence rather than death 
In mv view, the death penalty should be vacated and the case remanded for another penalty hearing to take place alter 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
vs. 
WAYNE S. TIPPETT, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
CASE NO. 95-0280 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Section 78-2-3 (i). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 
Appellant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea? 
The Court should review this case using an "abuse of 
discretion" standard, State vs. Mildenhall. 787 P. 2d 744, (Utah, 
1987). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
This case is governed in part by Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, which was at the time of the plea codified as 
Title 77, Chapter 35, Section 11(e), Utah Code Annotated. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal of the Eighth District Court's denial of
 a 
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea submitted by the defendant/ 
appellant on the 9th day of June, 1994. The motion was denied by 
two separate rulings; one dated June 29, 1994 and a supplementary 
ruling dated July 12, 1994. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
The Defendant/Appellant was charged in the Eighth District 
Court for Uintah County, State of Utah on the 18th of February, 
1986 with two counts of Aggravated Kidnapping in violation of 
Section 76-5-302 Utah Code Annotated. Each count also provided a 
Firearms Enhancement Provision pursuant to Section 76-3-203 Utah 
Code. On February 26, 1986 the Defendant/Appellant plead guilty 
to Count One of the Information. Count Two of the information was 
dismissed. The record does not reveal that any affidavit was used 
to assist the court in an explanation of Defendant/Appellant's Rule 
IKe) rights at the time of plea. After a colloquy with the 
Honorable Richard Davidson, the court accepted the guilty plea. 
The matter came before the court for sentencing on the 26th day of 
March, 1986, the Honorable Boyd Bunnell presiding. The Defendant/ 
Appellant was sentenced to a minimum mandatory sentence at the Utah 
State Prison of 15 years to life with a firearm enhancement 
requiring an additional 5 to 10 years to be served consecutively 
with the 15 years to life sentence- On May 20, 1987 at the request 
of the Chairman of the Board of Pardons, the court reviewed the 
Defendant/Appellant's sentence. The court, the Honorable Dennis 
Draney presiding, re-affirmed the sentence originally imposed- On 
June 9, 1994, Defendant filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea 
before the Eighth District Court. The plea was defective in that 
the elements of the offense were not explained to Defendant/ 
Appellant. It was further defective in that the trial court did 
not give the Defendant/Appellant the proper maximum punishment, nor 
explain the nature of the Utah indeterminative sentencing. Counsel 
for the Defendant/Appellant's performance was inadequate in that 
he did not explain any of the required Pre-requisites to a valid 
plea- The information was defective in that it did not adequately 
identify any victim of the alleged crime. Counsel's performance 
was also deficient in that he also did pursue any information to 
cure the defective information. All the prior judges having 
retired, resigned, or being deceased, the case was re-assigned to 
the Honorable John R- Anderson. Judge Anderson issued a summary 
ruling to the motion to dismiss, the State having given no response 
to the motion. That ruling, dated June 29, 1994 denied all aspects 
of Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea excepting for a 
response by the State the issue of an inadequate explanation of 
the firearms enhancement. After considering the State's response, 
on July 12, 1994 and giving the Defendant no opportunity to 
3 
consider the State's response, Judge Anderson issued a ruling 
denying the Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea in its 
entirety stating that the court had substantially complied with the 
requirements of Rule 11(e). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's denial of the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea 
is in error. The court made no findings that the appellant waived 
his right to self incrimination. The court made no findings that 
the appellant understood the nature and elements of the crime and 
that his plea admitted each and every element. The court 
incorrectly advised the defendant as to the maximum sentence which 
could be imposed. The information was deficient in that it did not 
advise the Defendant/Appellant of the identity of the victims. 
Defendant/Appellant was deprived of key elements of effective of 
counsel in that no discovery was requested, discussed with 
Defendant/Appellant, nor were there any attempts to explain the 
sentencing, or cure the defective information. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA BECAUSE IT FAILED TO 
COMPLY WITH RULE 11(e) OF THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. 
Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure in effect 
at the time appellant made his guilty plea as codified in 77-35-
11(e) provided as follows: 
The court . . . shall not accept a (plea of guilty) until the 
4 
court has made the findings: 
(1) That if the defendant is not represented by counsel 
he has knowingly waived his right to counsel and does not 
desire counsel; 
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) That the defendant knows he has rights against 
compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury trial and to 
confront and cross-examine in open court the witnesses 
against him, and that by entering the plea he waives all 
of those rights; 
(4) That the defendant understands the nature and 
elements of the offense to which he is entering the plea; 
that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of 
proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt; 
and that the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum and maximum 
sentence that may be imposed upon him for each offense 
to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of 
the imposition of consecutive sentences; and 
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result of a prior 
plea discussion and plea agreement and if so, what 
agreement has been reached. 
The record of the entry of pleas is very limited. From the 
record, it appears that no plea affidavit was used, therefore the 
court can only determine the trial court's compliance with rule 
11(e) based on the oral representations made in open court. 
That record is bereft of any discussion with the appellant on 
several critical points included in the rule. There is no 
discussion whatsoever with the appellant concerning his right 
against compulsory self incrimination as required by subsection (3) 
of the rule. There is no discussion of the nature and elements of 
the offense of aggravated kidnapping with a firearms enhancement 
as required by Subsection 4 of the rule. There is no discussion 
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or record that the guilty plea was an admission to each of the 
elements of the alleged crime as required by subsection 4 (Record 
PP 4-7). 
The record also reveals that the trial judge affirmative mis-
represented to the appellant the maximum sentence possible as a 
result of the plea. Subsection 5 of the rule required a finding 
that the defendant understands both the minimum and maximum 
possible sentence. At line 12, page 7 of the record, the trial 
judge informed the appellant that a one to five year enhancement 
was possible in addition to the five years to life he originally 
explained. No correction of that error was made. The appellant 
was sentenced to a five to ten year firearm enhancement in direct 
contradiction to what had been explained. 
The standard of review as previously stated is that of an 
"abuse of discretion1' by the court. The companion cases of Warner 
vs. Morris, 709 P. 2d 309 (Utah, 1985) and Brooks vs. Morris, 709 
P. 2d 310, (Utah, 1985), established the standard by which a trial 
court accepts guilty pleas. The Supreme Court stated that a 
failure of to advise a defendant of his rights concerning self-
incrimination was not alone sufficient to invalidate a guilty plea 
provided that the record as a whole showed that the rule 11 
requirements were substantially complied with. Subsequently the 
Supreme Court in State vs. Gibbons, 740 P. 2d 1309 (Utah, 1987) 
replaced the "substantial compliance" rule with a "strict 
compliance" standard. It has been ruled that the Gibbons rule was 
not retroactive, however the concepts set forth in Gibbons are 
u s e f u l . In Gibbons t h e c o u r t s t a t e d t h a t t h e t r i a l c u u r t may no t 
rp 1 y 11 in I rl P f en s P c o u n s e I i r M f f 11 \ \ i I I i 11 i 11 - I II11 \ \ • i i I i : 
r e q u i Huii«en* i L J u II I , '
 ti where hei »- ;& no 
a f f i d a v i t , t h e c o u r t h a s i n i t n a t t in much more a k i n t o Gibbons 
fac tum 1 1 y t h a n might I \ \ i -i I 1 hi m | 
I'IIH1 c a s e most m m i i a j ' in t h i s winch was r e a c h e d t h e a p p e l l a t e 
c o u r t s i s t h a t of S t a t e v s . Vas i l a c o p u l a s , 1 r»6 P, 2d <k (Utah App. , 
1988^ i tin in .i. ', , , i 11
 |jr , | ( ,4ai uer Brouk » l ^ s t 
I II if fin a b s e n c e >l d i s c u s s i o n c o n c e r n i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
c o n s e c u t i v e s e n t e n c e s , mil a f a i l u r e t o f i n d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t 
!
'
n
^ — - t o o r i t h a i [j i ,n I In i I H h n i i I i I I in i \v\ i i i i I 
' i Mi hiil I I i i i | ha I a lu i i f wa * s u f f i c i e n t tu m a n d a t e a 
r e v e r s a l of t h e U \n\ i o u r + f 3 d e n i a l >1 t h e d e f e n d a n t i mc,' i on t o 
Wi thd raw C u i l t " Pi I T m» i I i l l I I m I S M Hi f i i I • !lo 
" i n | j | ! In f m l M l i i I i n L n i g \ 1\H f a i l u r e i n : o n | j l y w i Mi t h e 
s e n t e n c i n g p r o p o r t i o n s of ihf? r u l e a s b e i n g s u f f i c i e m It can be 
p resumed t h a t i f t h e r e hi nil In i n i | i h I «n I In m | I inn! i f 
I I1' I ' I » C M I "» ! l I i . . i l e i i s e n a t l n * r " w a s i n t i n c a - , t h e 
i.*± 1 ]•»*•' n p o l a s r 'our l s h o u l n navf o n l " made i t s d e c i s i o n s t r o n g e r . 
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no t f a t a l in l i g h t I I l__ r e c o r d , t h e r e c o r d t h e r e wan muie 
complete that here. Here as well, we have not only a failure to 
inform appellant of the maximum sentence, but a misrepresentation 
by the court as to the maximum sentence. WHen coupled with the 
failure to discuss the elements of the offense, the combination is 
fatal to the trial court's ruling that the requirements had been 
substantially complied with. Finally, even though there was some 
discussion of some of the RUle 11 requirements at the time the plea 
was entered, no findings were made except that the plea was 
knowingly made. (Record p 8). 
POINT II 
THE PLEA WAS IMPROPERLY TAKEN BECAUSE THE INFORMATION 
DID NOT ADEQUATELY INFORM THE DEFENDSNT/APPELLANT OF THE 
NATURE OF THE CHARGES. 
The information to which the Defendant/Appellant alleges as 
follows: 
Count : AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, in violation Section 
76-5-302, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, on or 
about February 17, 1986, in Uintah County, Utah, a First 
Degree Felony; 
The said defendant at the time and place aforesaid 
did intentionally or knowingly, without authority of law 
and against the will of the victim, by any means and in 
any manner, seized, confined, detained, or transported 
the victim with intent: 
a. To hold for ransom or reward, or as shield 
of hostage, or to compel a third person to engage in 
particular conduct or to forbear from engaging in 
particular conduct; or 
b. To facilitate the commission, attempted 
commission, or flight after commission or attempted 
commission of felony; or 
c. To inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize 
the victim or another. . . . 
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and that the filing of a bill of particulars is normally one of the 
proper remedies to an inadequate information, that statement only 
illustrates another issue which will be addressed later in this 
matter, that is, the ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The lack of identity of the victims illustrates again the 
inadequacy of the inquiry at the time of the taking of his plea. 
It has already been stated that the record is bereft of any 
discussion of the elements of the offense charged. Because no bill 
of particulars was filed, the Defendant/Appellant did not have a 
more specific information that the original one which was filed. 
There is no indication that any request for discovery was ever 
filed nor that any discovery was given to the defendant. All of 
these things which might have had some curative effect upon the 
lack of the notice in the information did not occur. The failure 
to explain the elements of the crime, and to get a factual basis 
for the plea become even worse. 
POINT 3 
THE INADEQUATE ASSISTANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL FURTHER IMPAIRED 
THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S ABILITY TO UNDERSTAND THE PROCEEDINGS 
WHEN THE GUILTY PLEA WAS TAKEN. 
The performance of defense counsel in adequately representing 
his client is always a difficult issue in that much of any 
representation is not on the record. The attorney client privilege 
makes it difficult for an attorney to respond to ineffective 
assistance accusations, nevertheless there is guidance on what 
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. In state v.*, 
Moritzsky, 771 P 2d. 689 (Utah App. 1989), Defense attorney Lance 
10 
Wilkerson, the then Uintah County Public Defender, was found to 
have ineffectively assisted his client by failing to explore or 
request any instruction concerning the defense of habitation. 
Citing State v. Verde, 770 P 2d. 116 (Utah 1989) the appellate 
court stated the following test: "Defendant's Sixth Amendment 
challenge to his conviction will be successful only if he can prove 
that (1) his counsel rendered and objectively deficient 
performance, demonstrated by specific acts or omissions; and (2) 
counsel's error prejudiced the defendant, i.e. a reasonable 
probability' exist that but for counsel's omissions, the verdict 
would have been more favorable to defendant. 
While the court must not second guess tactical decisions made by 
counsel, the tactical analysis has little relevance in this case. 
In this case, Uintah County Public Defender Lance Wilkerson 
failed to request discovery. He failed to request a bill of 
particulars to clarify or cure an information that was devoid of 
notice of the identity of the alleged victim. He failed to explain 
the elements of the charge to his client. He failed to assist the 
court in establishing any factual basis for the entry of this plea. 
He failed to explain the nature of the firearm enhancement which 
was charged and sentenced to his client. He failed to appeal the 
errors in this plea immediately upon sentencing. 
The specific acts or omissions required have been shown 
precisely by the inadequacy of the record in this case. The second 
prong is harder to address because this is guilty plea case. To 
adequately assess whether a trial verdict would have been more 
11 
favorable to defendant/appellant than his plea is difficult. I 
must be noted however that since the defendant/appellant receive 
the maximum sentence allowed by law for one count of aggravate 
kidnapping, and the statutory preference was for concurren 
sentences at the time, it is hard to say that no better resul 
could have been obtained for the Defendant, 
CONCLUSION 
The record in this case shows affirmative mistakes by th 
court and counsel in the taking of appellant's plea. It does nc 
show strict compliance, substantial compliance, or anythin 
approaching the required standard. The process was furthe 
complicated by defense counsel's ineffective performance in th 
process of the plea. Since the information was defective in notic 
to the defendant, the problem grew even worse. Appellant heret 
prays that the court reverse the trial court's denial of his Motic 
to Withdraw Guilty Plea and remand the case for furthe 
proceedings. 
DATED this /— day of Ap^t ^ , 1996. 
Alan M. Williams 
Attorney for Appellant 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
WAYNE STEVEN TIPPETT AKA 
TOM PETERSON, TERRELL 
DANN KELLY, STEVE WAYNE 
TIPPETT, DANIEL MITCHELL 
KELLEY, 
DEFENDANT. 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF 
ARRAIGNMENT 
CASE NO. 86-CR-14U 
BE IT REMEMBERED, THAT ON TEE 26TH DAY OF 
JANUARY, 1986, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 10:00 A.M., THE 
ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN THE DISTRICT 
COURTROOM OF THE UINTAH COUNTY COURTHOUSE, VERNAL, UTAH; 
SAID CAUSE BEING HEARD BY TEE HONORABLE RICHARD C. DAVIDSON, 
JUDGE IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH. 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
MARK W. NASH, ESQ. 
UINTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
152 EAST 100 NORTH 
VERNAL, UTAH 84078 
LANCE T. WILKERSON, ESQ. 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
319 WEST 100 SOUTH, SUITE A 
VERNAL, UTAH 84078 
FILED 
DISTRICT COURT 
UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH 
JUL 221988 
DOROTHY LUCK, CLERK 
BY <S@-t*r- ncPMTY 
I II P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 
3 || THE COURT: BE ON THE RECORD IN CASE NUMBER 
86-CR-14, STATE OF UTAH V. WAYNE STEVEN TIPPETT, TERREL 
5 II DANN KELLY, STEVE WAYNE TIPPETT, DANIEL MITCHELL KELLEY. 
6 COME FORWARD, PLEASE. 
7 THE RECORD WILL INDICATE THE DEFENDANT IS PRESENT, 
8 TOGETHER WITH COUNSEL, MR. WILKERSON. THIS IS THE TIME FOR 
9 ARRAIGHMENT, THE PRELIMINARY HEARING HAVING BEEN WAIVED 
10 || DOWNSTAIRS IN CIRCUIT COURT, AND THE MATTER HAVING BEEN 
II II BOUND OVER TO THIS COURT. ARE YOU READY TO PROCEED? 
MR. WILKERSON: IN THIS MATTER THERE'S BEEN A PLEA 
13 || ARRANGEMENT ARRIVED AT IN THIS CASE. THE DEFENDANT INTENDS 
U TO ENTER A PLEA TO COUNT I, AND THAT COUNT II WILL BE 
15 DISMISSED. IT SHOULD BE FURTHER NOTICED THAT THE COUNTY 
16 ATTORNEY HAS AGREED TO RECOMMEND THAT IN THE EVENT THE 
17 DEFENDANT IS TRANSPORTED TO ANOTHER FACILITY OUTSIDE OF THIS 
18 STATE, NAMELY THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA IS PROBABLY THE 
19 MOST LIKELY, THAT HE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT THE DEFENDANT 
20 RECEIVE TIME F O R — C R E D I T FOR TIME SERVED THERE AGAINST HIS 
21 SENTENCE HERE IN THIS STATE, AND THAT FURTHER THAT THERE HAS 
22 I BEEN NO REPRESENTATIONS AS TO WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO ANY OTHER 
22 J CHARGES THAT MAY BE PENDING IN ANY OTHER JURISDICTION, SUCH 
24 AS SALT LAKE COUNTY OR THE FEDERAL AUTHORITIES OR WITH THOSE 
25 IN SOUTH CAROLINA. 
-2-
THE COURT: IS THAT THE UNDERSTANDING, MR. NASH? 
2
 II MR> N A S K : THAT IS CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. WELL, I 
3 I WOULD LIKE TO PUT ON THE RECORD THAT I DO NOT HAVE AUTHORITY 
AND DO NOT AT THIS TIME ATTEMPT TO SPEAK FOR ANY OTHER 
5 || JURISDICTION, EITHER SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE FEDERAL AUTHORITIES 
OR SOUTH CAROLINA. I HAVE MADE THE DEFENDANT AWARE OF THAT 
IN CIRCUIT COURT YESTERDAY. I WOULD, HOWEVER, RECOMMEND, 
ASSUMING HE IS SENTENCED TO TIME IN THE PENITENTIARY, I 
WILL RECOMMEND TO THE COURT THAT IN THE EVENT HE IS 
TRANSFERRED TO ANOTHER PENITENTIARY THAT HE BE GIVEN CREDIT 
FOR TIME SERVED IN THAT OTHER PENITENTIARY AGAINST HIS UTAH 
ScNTENCE. THAT'S THE ONLY RECOMMENDATION THAT I AM PREPARED 
OR WILL MAKE AS TO SENTENCING. ANYTHING ELSE I HAVE MADE NO 
AGREEMENTS TO ASK FOR LENIENCY ON THE SENTENCING ON COUNT I 
5 II IN ANY RESPECT. 
16
 "
 T H E
 COURT: THIS BEING THE TIME FOR ARRAIGNMENT, 
17 II LET US PROCEED. 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
14 
EXAMINATION 
18 
19 
20 || BY THE COURT 
21
 'I Q FIRST OF ALL IS WAYNE TIPPETT YOUR TRUE AND CORRECT 
22 || NAME? 
23
 A WAYNE STEVEN TIPPETT, 
24
 Q ?OU ARE KNOWN BY THESE OTHER ALIASES LISTED HERE 
25 ON THE INFORMATION? 
-3-
A YES, SIR. 
Q WAYNE STEVEN TIPPETT IS YOUR TRUE AND CORRECT NAME? 
A YES, SIR. 
Q IS IT S-T-E-V-E-N? 
A YES. 
Q FOR THE RECORD, MR. TIPPETT, ARE YOU SUFFERING 
FROM THE EFFECTS OF ANY ALCOHOL OR DRUGS AT THIS TIME? 
A NOT TODAY. I WAS ON METHODOME IN SALT LAKE, BUT 
I AM NO LONGER. 
Q ALL RIGHT. YOU UNDERSTAND WHAT THIS PROCEEDING 
IS? 
A YES, SIR. 
Q YOU UNDERSTAND YOU ARE BEING CALLED UPON TO MAKE 
A PLEA OF GUILTY OR NOT GUILTY? 
A YES, SIR. 
Q ARE YOU PREPARED TO GO FORTH WITH THIS MATTER? 
A YES. 
THE COURT: HAVE YOU BEEN FURNISHED WITH A COPY OF 
THE INFORMATION? 
MR. WILKERSON: YES WE HAVE, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: DO YOU WAIVE THE READING OF THAT? 
MR. WILKERSON: YES. 
Q (BY THE COURT) YOU UNDERSTAND, MR. TIPPETT, THAT 
YOU ARE CHARGED WITH THE CRIME OF AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING IN 
VIOLATION OF 76-5-302. THAT'S A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, WHICH 
-4-
ALLEGES THAT YOU AT THE TIME AND PLACE DID TAKE CONTROL OF 
PEOPLE AND CAUSE THEM TO BE TRANSPORTED AGAINST THEIR WILL. 
YOU HELD THEM UNDER YOUR CONTROL AGAINST THEIR WILL, AND 
THAT IN FACT YOU DID UTILIZE A FIREARM IN THE COMMISSION OF 
THAT OFFENSE. YOU ARE AWARE OF THAT CHARGE? 
A ?ES, SIR. 
Q ARE YOU PREPARED AT THIS TIME TO ENTER A PLEA TO 
THAT CHARGE? 
A YES, SIR. 
2 WHAT PLEA DO YOU INTEND TO ENTER? 
A GUILTY. 
Q PRIOR TO ACCEPTING A GUILTY PLEA, MR. TIPPETT, I'M 
SURE THAT YOU ARE AMARE THAT YOU HAVE CERTAIN CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS WHICH ARE VERY VALUABLE AND YOU HAVE TO WAIVE THOSE 
RIGHTS BEFORE I CAN ACCEPT A GUILTY PLEA. THE FIRST AND MOST 
OF THOSE RIGHTS IS YOUR RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
THAT'S THE REASON MR. ^ILKERSCN IS PRESENT TODAY. HE OR 
ANOTHER ATTORNEY WOULD REPRESENT YOU TODAY AND AT THE TRIAL 
OF THIS MATTER, AND EVEN ON THE APPEAL LEVEL IF IT WENT THAT 
FAR. DO YOU UNDERSTAND YOU HAVE THAT RIGHT? 
A YES, SIR. 
G YOU UNDERSTAND NOBODY CAN TAKE THAT RIGHT FROM YOU, 
THAT YOU ARE ENTITLED TO THAT AND IT'S A RIGHT GIVEN BY THE 
STATE? DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT? 
A YES, SIR. 
6 
1 1 
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M C DO YOU UNDERSTATED THAT YOU ALSO HAVE A RIGHT TO A 
2 TRIAL IN THIS MATTER, A TRIAL 3Y JURY? 
3
 || A YES, SIR. 
Q WHEREIN THE STATE WOULD HAVE TO GO FORWARD AND 
5 PROVE EACH AND EVERY ELEMENT OF THIS OFFENSE BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT TO THE SATISFACTION OF ALL EIGHT JURORS, 
7 AND ALL EIGHT JURORS WOULD HAVE TO AGREE ON YOUR GUILT BEFORE 
8 YOU COULD BE FOUND GUILTY. DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT? 
9
 A YES, SIR. 
10
 || Q D 0 Y°U UNDERSTAND THAT YOU HAVE AT THE TIME OF 
TRIAL THE RIGHT TO CROSS-EMAMINE THE WITNESSES BROUGHT AGAIN3" 
YOU? THAT IS, YOUR COUNSEL. FURTHERMORE, YOU HAVE THE RIGHT 
3 II TO COMPULSORY PROCESS TO BRING ANY WITNESSES TO TELL YOUR 
14 II SIDE OF THE STORY, TO PUT ON YOUR CASE. DO YOU UNDERSTAND 
'5 II THAT? 
6
 || A YES. 
Q DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT IF YOU GO THROUGH THIS 
TRIAL AND IF YOU WERE CONVICTED 3Y THE JURY THAT YOU EVEN 
HAVE A RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS MATTER TO THE UTAH STATE SUPREME 
COURT, AND YOU ARE GIVING THAT RIGHT UP AS WELL AS THESE 
OTHER VALUABLE RIGHTS I? YOU PLEAD GUILTY? 
22 || A YES. 
3 !l
 2 MR. TIPPETT, OTHER THAN THE DISMISSAL OF COUNT I 
2- AND THE PRESENTATIONS MADE 3Y THE COUNTY ATTORNEY HERE TODAY 
2
- j IN OPEN COURT, HAS ANYBODY PROMISED YOU ANYTHING TO GET YOU 
!7 
18 
19 
20 
21 
1 TO MAKE THIS PLEA? 
2 A NO, SIR. 
3 Q ANYBODY THREATENED YOU IN ANY WAY? 
4 I! A NO, SIR. 
5 Q ARE YOU MAKING THIS PLEA OF YOUR OWN FREE WILL AND 
6 CHOICE? 
7 A YES, SIR. 
9 I Q ¥OU UNDERSTAND THAT BEING A FIRST DEGREE FELONY 
I 
o | CARRIES WITH IT A SENTENCE OF FIVE YEARS TO LIFE IN THE 
,0 UTAH STATE PRISON? 
n A YES, SIR. 
12 J Q IT ALSO CARRIES WITH IT A FIREARM ENHANCEMENT 
PENALTY OF NOT LESS THAN ONE OR UP TO FIVE YEARS ON TOP OF 
M || THAT. DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT? 
15 A YES, SIR. 
io {I MR. NASH: YOUR HONOR, I WOULD POINT OUT, AND THE 
COURT SHOULD INFORM THE DEFENDANT, I BELIEVE THAT THE 
18 ,j AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING CARRIES A MINIMUM MANDATORY SENTENCE 
AS WELL, WHICH IS FIVE, TEN, FIFTEEN, DEPENDING ON THE 
2c 'I SENTENCING. 
2' || Q (BY THE COURT) YOU UNDERSTAND AN AGGRAVATEP 
KIDNAPPING IS A MINIMUM MANDATORY OF FIVE, TEN, FIFTEEN 
YEARS AT THE DISCRETION OF THE COURT? 
A YES, SIR. 
25 II Q YOU UNDERSTAND THAT? 
1 A YES, SIR. 
2 Q HAS ANYBODY MADE ANY REPRESENTATIONS TO YOU ABOUT 
3 II WHAT THIS COURT MAY OR MAY NOT DO IN THE WAY OF SENTENCING? 
A NO. 
5 || Q YOU UNDERSTAND NOBODY CAN MAKE ANY REPRESENTATIONS 
6 THAT ARE YOU IN ANY WAY BINDING ON THIS COURT IN SENTENCING, 
7 THIS IS MY JOB AND NOBODY ELSE'S? 
8 A YES, SIR. 
9
 Q ARE YOU MAKING THIS PLEA BECAUSE YOU ARE IN FACT 
i0 || GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING? 
A YES, SIR. 
12
 j| Q MR. TIPPETT, HAVING IN MIND THE RIGHTS THAT I HAVE 
13 EXPLAINED TO YOU, AND THE POSSIBLE PENALTIES YOU ARE LOOKING 
U AT, TO COUNT I, THE CRIME BEING AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, WHAT 
15 IS YOUR PLEA? 
16 A GUILTY. 
17
 THE COURT: THE COURT WILL ACCEPT THE GUILTY PLEA, 
18 FINDING THAT IT IS KNOWINGLY MADE. 
'9 WHAT IS YOUR DESIRE AS TO SENTENCING? 
20 MR. WILKERSON: WELL, YOUR HONOR, IN THIS MATTER 
21 DUE TO THE DEFENDANT'S PRIOR RECORD HE WOULD LIKE TO BE 
22 SENTENCED TODAY IF THAT WOULD BE POSSIBLE. OF COURSE, IT'S 
23 UP TO THE COURT TO DECIDE WHETHER IT HAS ENOUGH INFORMATION 
24 AVAILABLE. 
25 THE COURT: MR. NASH? 
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MR. NASH: YOUR HONOR, THE STATE DOES NOT FEEL 
IT'S PREPARED AT THIS Tll'JE TO PROCEED WITH SENTENCING, 
BECAUSE OF THE BRIEF TIME WE HAVE HAD TO WORK ON THIS. WE 
HAVEN'T RECEIVED ALL TEE INFORMATION WZ NEED OUT OF SOUTH 
CAROLINA AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS, AND WE WILL REQUEST THE 
MATTER BE REFERRED TO ADULT PR03ATION AND PAROLE FOR A 
PRE-SENTENCE REPORT. 
THE COURT: YOU HAVE A RIGHT, MR. TIPPETT, TO BE 
SENTENCED NOT SOONER THAN TWO DAYS FROM TODAY AND NOT LATER 
THAN THIRTY DAYS. WHAT IS YOUR DESIRE IN THIS MATTER? 
MR. WILKZRSCN: WELL, HE IS SOMEWHAT ANXIOUS TO GET 
I THE SENTENCING OVER WITH. 
THE WITNESS: I WANT TO GET SENTENCED TO GET BACK 
| TO SOUTH CAROLINA AND START GETTING ON THE TIME. 
BUT AS FAR AS CHECKING INTO MY BACKGROUND, I HAVE 
A PRETTY GOOD WORK RECORD AND EVERYTHING IN SALT LAKE UP 
UNTIL THE LAST YEAR OR SO. SO I DON'T KNOW IF IT WOULD 3E 
BETTER FOR ME TO GO AHEAD AND DO A CHECK, JUST GO ON AND 
SENTENCE. THAT'S MY PROBLEM. SO I DON'T REALLY KNOW. I'LL 
TAKE HIS RECOMMENDATION. 
THE COURT: YOU UNDERSTAND BY SENTENCING YOU TODAY, 
HAVING NO OTHER INFORMATION, THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE I HAVE IS 
INCARCERATION? 
THE WITNESS: I REALIZE THAT. 
THE COURT: I THINK IT BETTER IN YOUR BEST 
INTEREST TO HAVE THIS MATTER REFERRED AND HAVE A REPORT 
PREPARED. I DON'T KNOW HOW LONG THAT WOULD TAKE. 
MR. WILKERSON: I WOULD THINK THEY COULD DO IT 
WITHIN THE THIRTY-DAY PERIOD. 
THE COURT: I WOULD THINK SO EASILY WITHIN THIRTY 
DAYS, AND IF THEY COULD GET IT DONE SOONER WE COULD TAKE 
CARE OF THIS MATTER SOONER. 
MR. WILKERSON: OKAY. I THINK THAT WOULD ALSO 
GIVE THE COURT—GET SOME BACKGROUND ON WHAT HAPPENED. 
THERE WAS NO INJURY OR ANYTHING DONE TO THE VICTIMS. THEY 
WERE NOT HELD FOR A VERY LONG PERIOD OF' TIME. IT MAY BE WELI 
IF THE COURT WAS AWARE OF THE FACTUAL SITUATION, TOO. THAT 
WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE IF HE WERE SENTENCED TODAY. 
THE COURT: LET'S REFER THIS MATTER TO THE 
DEPARTMENT OF ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE FOR THE PREPARATION 
OF A PRE-SENTENCE REPORT. IS THAT AGREEABLE WITH YOU, MR. 
TIPPETT? 
THE WITNESS: YES, SIR. 
THE COURT: THAT WILL BE THE ORDER OF THE COURT. 
AS SOON AS THAT HAS BEEN PREPARED AND CIRCULATED LET'S BRING 
IT BACK UP HERE. WE'LL FIM SENTENCING TENTATIVELY FOR TWO 
LAW AND MOTION DAYS FROM NOW. 
THE CLERK: MARCH 26TH. 
THE COURT: MARCH 26TH. IF IT'S DONE SOONER THAT 
WILL TAKE CARE OF IT SOONER THAN THAT. THANK YOU. 
MR. NASH: YOUR HONOR, AS TO COUNT II, THE STATE 
WOULD AT THIS TIME MOVE FOR THE DISMISSAL OF COUNT II. 
THE COURT: YOU HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THAT? 
MR. WILKERSON: NO OBJECTION. 
THE COURT: COUNT II IS DISMISSED. 
(WHEREUPON THIS ARRAIGNMENT WAS CONCLUDED.) 
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
. VS .T* „ 
DANIEL TERR3L KELLEY 
AKA: TOM PETERSON, TERREL DANNY 
KELLY, STEVE WAYNE TIPPETT, 
DANIEL MITCHELL KELLEY 
DOB:8/28/52, 9/28/52, 
Defendant. 
ntA /v 
CASE NO. f(n O^rf*) 
The u n d e r s i g n e d RICK HAWKINS, under oath s t a t e s on 
i n f o r m a t i o n and b e l i e f t h a t the defendant committed the crimes 
of: 
COUNT I : AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, i n v i o l a t i o n of Sect ion 
7 6 - 5 - 3 0 2 , Utah Code A n n o t a t e d , 1 9 5 3 , as amended, on or about 
February 17, 19 86, in Uintah County, Utah, a F i r s t Degree Felony; 
The s a i d Defendant at the time and place a foresa id 
d i d i n t e n t i o n a l l y or k n o w i n g l y , w i t h o u t authority of law and 
a g a i n s t t h e w i l l of the v i c t i m , by any means and in any manner, 
s e i z e d , c o n f i n e d , d e t a i n e d , or t r a n s p o r t e d t h e v i c t i m with 
intent:: 
a . To h o l d f o r ransom or reward, or as a s h i e l d 
of h o s t a g e , or t o compel a t h i r d person to engage in par t i cu lar 
conduct or to forbear from engaging in part icular conduct; or 
b . To f a c i l i t a t e t h e c o m m i s s i o n , a t t e m p t e d 
commiss ion , or f l i g h t a f t e r commission or attempted commission of 
a fe lony; or 
c . To i n f l i c t b o d i l y in jury on or to t e r r o r i z e 
the vict im or another. 
FIREARM ENHANCEMENT, in v i o l a t i o n of S e c t i o n 
7 6 - 3 - 2 0 3 , Utah Code A n n o t a t e d , 1 9 5 3 , as amended/ on or about 
February 17, 19 86, in Uintah County, Utah; 
The s a i d D e f e n d a n t a t the time and place a foresa id 
d i d u s e a f i r e a r m o r a f a c s i m i l e of a f i r e a r m or t h e 
the commission or furtherance of 
u s e 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a firearm in 
the Felony offense alleged in Count I. 
CO UNT. 
7 6 - 5 - 3 B . 2 , 
February " 
d i d 
a g a i n s t 
s e i zed , 
i n t e n t : 
I I ; AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, i n v i o l a t i o n of Sec t ion 
Utah Code A n n o t a t e d , 19 5 3 , as amended, on or^aroout 
19 86, in Uintah County, Utah, a F i r s t Degre^F^ lony ; 
The s a i d Defendant a t t he time and p l a p ^ a f o r e s a i d 
i n t e n t i o r ^ a i l l y o r k n o w i n g l y , w i t h o u t autho£**£y of law and 
t h e w i r i f of t h e v i c t i m , by any means a*ra in any manner, 
c o n f i n e d / \ d e t a i n e d , o r t r a n s p o r t e d t h e v i c t im with 
of h o s t a g e , 
conduct or t o 
c o m m i s s i o n , 
a f e l o n y ; or 
the v i c t i m or 
a , To frqld f o r ransom^xJr reward, or as a s h i e l d 
or t o compek a t h i r d p^ar^on t o engage in p a r t i c u l a r 
forbear from eh^aginqxln p a r t i c u l a r conduct; or 
To Eacilrxajte t h e c o m m i s s i o n , a t t e m p t e d 
or f l i gh t a f t e r 
c . To 
another , 
l i c t 
f ission or a t tempted commission of 
s i ly i n j u r y on or to t e r r o r i z e 
FIREARM ENHANCEMENT, i n N H L o l a t i o n of S e c t i o n 
7 6 - 3 - 2 0 3 , Ut^rn Code A n n o t a t e d , 1 9 5 3 , as^ amended, on or about 
February 17^X19 86, in Uintah County, Utah; 
The s a i d D e f e n d a n t a t t he t ime £nd place a f o r e s a i d 
u ^ e a f i r e a r m o r a f a c s i m i l e of a xJ . rearm o r t h e 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a f i r ea rm in the commission or f u r t h e r a n c e of 
th*r Felony offense a l l e g e d in Count ^ P 
T h i s i n f o r m a t i o n i s b a s e d on e v i d e n c e obtained a^om f he 
following witnesses: 
Authorized for presentment 
and filing: COMPLAINANT \j 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o bjdfore 
me this /^-^day of -fcsJw. 
19 86.. *f !< 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Robert G. JOHNSON, Defendant and Appellant 
No.900598-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Dec. 19,1991. 
Defendant was convicted in the Second District Court, Weber County, Ronald 0 Hvde. J., of six felonv counts of 
securities fraud, six felony counts of sale of unregistered securities, and one felony count of employing unregistered 
securities agent and he appealed. The Court of Appeals, Greenwood. J., held that. (1) defendant was denied effective 
assistance of counsel dne to counsel's conflict of interest and (2) defendant's purported waiver of conflict-free counsel 
was not valid and did not preclude his claim of ineffective assistance. 
Reversed and remanded for new tnal. 
[1] CRIMINAL LAW <§=> 1134(3) 
HOkl 134(3) 
While ordinarily claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be addressed by collateral attack through habeas corpus 
proceedmgs, claim may be raised on direct appeal in limited circumstances, such as when mere anew counsel on 
appeal and there is adequate tnal record. U.S.C.A. Const Amend. 6. 
12] CRIMINAL LAW <®=>641.5(.5) 
110k641.5(.5) 
Formerly 110k6415 
Right under Sixth Amendment to have assistance of counsel for one's defense in cnmmal prosecution guarantees all 
cnmmal defendants nght to effective assistance of counsel, and includes nght to counsel free from conflicts of interest. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
[2] CRIMINAL LAW @s»641.13(l) 
110k641.13(l) 
Right under Sixth Amendment to have assistance of counsel for one's defense in cnmmal prosecution guarantees all 
cnmmal defendants nght to effective assistance of counsel, and includes nght to counsel free from conflicts of interest. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
[3] CRIMINAL LAW <§=»641.13(1) 
110k641.13(l) 
Purpose of nght of effective assistance of counsel is to ensure that criminal defendants receive fan* tnals. but while 
defendant should be afforded fair opportunity to hire attorney of his choice, that nght is not absolute. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 6. 
141 CRIMINAL LAW <®»641.5(7) 
110k641.5(7) 
Standard for analyzing Sixth Amendment claim grounded on conflict of interest differs from that used for other 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims: defendant who did not object to conflict at tnal has burden on appeal of 
demonstrating with specificity that actual conflict of interest existed which adversely affected his lawyer's performance. 
and if such showing is made, prejudice will be presumed. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
[5] CRIMINAL LAW <®=»641.5(.5) 
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110k641.5(.5) 
Formerly 110k641.5 
Defendant being prosecuted for violations of state securities law was denied effective assistance of counsel as result of 
conflict of interest of his trial counsel who was implicated as conspirator in testimony of State's chief prosecution 
witness and in prosecutor's closing argument: effect of conflict was evidenced in counsel's questioning of chief 
prosecution witness, his failure to call defendant as witness, and his failure to object to comments of prosecutor during 
closing argument. Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rules 1.7(b), 8.4(d); U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. 
[6] CRIMINAL LAW <@=>641.13(1) 
110k641.13(l) 
Counsel's conduct may be examined in light of prevailing professional and ethical standards to determine whether 
defendant received effective representation. U.S.C A Const.Amend 6. 
[7] CRIMINAL LAW <®^641.10(1) 
110k641.10(1) 
Test for determining on appeal whether attorney should have been disqualified from case because of appearance of 
impropriety is two-pronged: first, court must find that there is at least reasonable possibility that some specifically 
identifiable impropriety occurred because of representation, though proof of actual wrongdoing is not necessary, and 
second, court must balance likelihood of public suspicion or obloquy against social interest in allowing defendant to 
continue being represented by lawyer of his choice. Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rules 1.7(b), 8.4(d). 
[81 CRIMINAL LAW <®=>641.5(7) 
110k641.5(7) 
Defendant's purported waiver during pretrial proceeding of any potential conflict of interest arising from his 
representation by trial counsel did not preclude defendant's claim of ineffective assistance based upon counsel's 
implication as coconspirator during trial, because waiver was based on representations contrary to what actually 
happened at trial and incomplete knowledge of possible consequences. U.C.A.1953,61-1-1,61-1-3,61-1- 7,61-1-21: 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
[9] CRIMINAL LAW <§=>641.5(7) 
110k641.5(7) 
Defendant can generally waive his right to conflict-free counsel, but to be valid decision must be knowing and 
intelligent and made only after adequate warning by trial court of potential hazards posed by conflict of interest and of 
accused's right to other counsel; validity of waiver depends upon whether defendant knew enough about possible 
consequences to make informed choice. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
[10] CRIMINAL LAW <®=*64L5(7) 
U0k641.5(7) 
Trial courts have discretion to grant waiver of right to coaflict-free counsel and are not expected to foresee all possible 
events which may take place during trial. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
[11] CRIMINAL LAW <®»641.5(7) 
110k641.5(7) 
Trial courts can refuse to accept defendant's waiver of oonflict-free counsel where there is either actual or potential 
conflict of interest between defendant and counsel. U.S.CA. Const.Amend. 6. 
*486 Michael F. Olmstead (argued), Ogden. for defendant and appellant. 
R. Paul Van Dam. State Atty. Gen. and Kenneth A Bronston, Asst. Atty. Gen.. Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and 
appellee. 
Before GARFF. GREENWOOD and RUSSON, JJ. 
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OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Defendant Robert G. Johnson appeals his conviction of six felony counts of securities fraud in violation of Utah Code 
Ann- §§ 61-1-1(2) and 61-1- 21 (1989), six felony counts of sale of unregistered securities in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §§61-1-7 and61-l-21 (1989), and one felony count of employing an unregistered securities agent in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-3(2) and 61-1-21 (1989). He appeals on the basis that he was denied effective assistance of 
counsel at trial. We reverse and remand. [FN1] 
FN1. Defendant also raises other issues on appeal which we do not reach because of our resolution of his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim. 
BACKGROUND 
As a result of a criminal investigation by the Utah Attorney General's Office, defendant was arrested and charged bv 
information with thirteen felony counts of securities violations. He retained attoraev Joseph Bottum to represent him. 
Pursuant to its investigation, the State had reason to believe that Bottum had substantial knowledge of and had 
participated in one of the transactions which formed the basis of the charges against defendant. The State anticipated 
presenting evidence in that regard at trial including possibly calling Bottum as a witness. The State filed a pretrial 
motion informing the court of the possible conflict of interest between defendant; and Bottnm. In its motion, the State 
requested that the court order Bottum and defendant to state on the record the nature and extent of the conflict and to 
explain to defendant the potential effect on his defense if Bottum were called to testify at trial The State moved the 
court to either allow defendant to waive the conflict or to disqualify Bottum from lurther representog defendant. 
The State attached to its motion an affidavit of Ed Morin, an investigator with the Utah Division of Securities, who had 
investigated die transactions that resulted in defendant's charges. The affidavit contained the Mowing statements. 
Monn had obtained evidence that Bottum knew about and participated in the planning of the investment program in 
question. Bottum received cash from defendant to purchase stock or an interest in a company that was to be merged 
with another company and sold. The transaction would provide profits to the participants, including Bottum, defendant 
the investors, and others. When Bottum was unable to complete the transaction, he returned over $50,000 in cash. 
which defendant had collected, to defendant for further use in the scheme. Morin also stated that the State alleged that 
*487 the completed transaction constituted the sale of unregistered securities and that fraudulent and false statements 
were made in connection with the sale of the investment. In its accompanying memorandum, the State said it planned to 
present this evidence at trial 
The court held a hearing on the State's motion. At the hearing, Bottum represented to the court that he had no 
knowledge of or involvement in the transactions. He stated that he "had nothing to do with [the sale of securities]," and 
that he knew of no reason why he would be called to testify. The State discussed the information it had showing thai 
Bottum was involved. The State indicated Bottum would not be called as a witness by the prosecution, but that other 
witnesses would testify about Bottom's involvement. Bottom, however, repeatedlv contended that he "was at a loss tc 
understand what they're talking about." He stated that if the State were correct, there would be "a tremendous problem 
for [his] client" but if such evidence were presented at triaL defendant could rebut all of it and exonerate Bottum 
through his testimony. After being informed that evidence might be introduced at trial implicating Bottum, and thai 
Bottum would not be able to take the stand to refute it defendant told the court he still wished to have Bottum represem 
him. 
At trial the State's chief prosecution witness was Blake Adams. Adams had originally been charged as a co-defendan 
with defendant but had pleaded guilty. Adams testified tint defendant introduced him to Bottum and that the three oi 
them formed a partnership. He testified that he and defendant met with Bottum in Bottum's law office where Bottun 
told diem he knew of a company which could be purchased through stock acquisition and then merged with anothe: 
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company. Bottum told them he had access to the company or an individual who controlled the company. Bottum 
offered to take care of the filings and have the stock traded properly. Defendant and Adams were to raise the money. 
Bottum. defendant and Adams would split the proceeds in thirds. Adams further testified that as part of the deaL they 
used funds from their partnership in the form of a check made out to Joseph Bottum Trust Account. Adams testified 
that the scheme "was a [defendant], Adams and Bottum thing." In his closing argument the prosecutor recounted 
Adams's testimony about Bottum's involvement. 
On appeal defendant argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment due 
to a conflict of interest between him and his attorney. He argues that his waiver during the pretrial hearing is invalid 
because a defendant as a matter of law, cannot waive such a conflict. 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
[1] While ordinarily a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be addressed by collateral attack through habeas 
corpus proceedings, in limited circumstances, the claim may be raised on direct appeal. State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 
1027,1029 (Utah 1991); United States v. Swanson. 943 F.2d 1070,1072 (9th Cir.1991); United States v. Tatum. 943 
F.2d 370, 380 (4th Cir.1991); Government of Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 133-34 (3d Cir.1984). Those 
circumstances exist when there is new counsel on appeal and there is an adequate trial record. Zepp, 748 F.2d at 
133-34. We find both present in this case, and therefore proceed to consider the merits of defendant's claims. 
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is usually a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182. 
186 (Utah 1990) (citing Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 698. 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2070, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). 
Although there are no fact findings as to the ineffectiveness of counsel here, the record of what actually transpired 
allows us to determine on appeal, as a matter of law, whether defense counsel's performance constituted ineffective 
counsel Zepp, 748 F 2d at 133-34. 
[2] The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: "In all criminal *488 prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." This right guarantees all criminal defendants 
the right to effective assistance of counsel, Templin, 805 P.2d at 186. and "includes the right to counsel free from 
conflicts of interest." State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 72 (Utah App. 1990) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 
2065). 
[3] The purpose of the right to effective assistance of counsel is to ensure that criminal defendants receive fair trials. 
Strickland. 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. While a defendant "should be afforded a fair opportunity" to hire the 
attorney of his or her choice, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,53, 53 S.Ct. 55,58,77 LJEd. 158 (1932), that right is not 
absolute. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 108 S.Ct. 1692. 1697, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988); United States v. 
Collins, 920 F.2d 619,625 (10th Cir.1990) cert, denied, 500 U.S. 920, 111 S.Ct. 2022. 114 L.Ed.2d 108 (1991) (citing 
United States v. Gipson. 693 F.2d 109, 111 (10th Cir.1982) cert, denied. 459 U.S. 1216, 103 S.Ct. 1218, 75 L.Ed.2d 
455 (1983)). The right to effective assistance of counsel seeks to "guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal 
defendant" Wheat, 108 S.Ct. at 1697, and is paramount to a defendant's right to be represented by an attorney of his or 
her choice. "Courts therefore must balance a defendant's constitutional right to retain counsel of his [or her] choice 
against the need to maintain the highest standards of professional responsibility, the public's confidence in the integrity 
of the judicial process and the orderly administration of justice." Collins, 920 F.2d at 626 (citations omitted). 
The right to effective assistance of counsel is "so basic to a fair trial that [its] infraction can never be treated as 
harmless error." Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489, 98 S.Ct. 1173. 1181. 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978) (quoting 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18. 23. 87 S.Ct. 824, 827- 28. 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)); State v. Velarde. 306 P.2d 
1190. 1192 (Utah App.1991). 
Conflict of Interest 
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[4] "[A] sixth amendment claim grounded on conflict of interest is a special subtype of an ineffectiveness claim" and 
must be analyzed under the following standard, which is different than that used for other ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims Velarde, 806 P 2d at 1192, Webb, 790 P 2d at 72 A defendant who did not object to the conflict at 
trial has the burden on appeal of demonstrating with specificity that "an actual conflict of interest existed which 
adversely affected his [or her] lawyer's performance " Webb, 790 P 2d at 73 (quoting Cuvler v Sullivan, 446 U S 335, 
348, lOOSCt 1708 1718,64 L Ed 2d 333 (1980)), Zepp, 748 F 2d at 135-36 (citmg Wood v Georgia. 450 U S 261 
271, 101 S Ct 1097, 1103, 67 L EA2d 220 (1981)) If the defendant makes <mch a showing, prejudice need not be 
demonstrated to prevail on the claim Cuyler, 446 U S at 349-50, 100 S Ct at 1718-19, Webb, 790 P 2d at 73 The 
court will presume the defendant was prejudiced b> the lawyer's performance United States v Cronic. 466 U S 648 
658, 104 S Ct 2039, 2046, 80 L Ed 2d 657 (1984), Webb, 790 P 2d at 73 (quotmg Strickland, 466 U S at 692, 104 
SCt at 2067) 
[5] Utah appellate decisions have addressed counsel's conflict of interest only m die context of representation of 
miiltiple clients and a potential conflict of interest among those clients No Utah cases have presented facts where, as 
here, the alleged conflict of interest is between the lawyer and the client We therefore look to other jurisdictions to 
determine if an actual conflict of interest exists here, and if so, whether it adversely affected counsel' 5 performance We 
find Zepp, 748 F 2d 125, and United States v Hobson, 672 F 2d 825 (11th Cu ) (per curiam), cert denied, 459 U S 
906, 103 SCt 208 74 L Ed 2d 166 (1982), particularly helpful 
In Zepp, defendant was arrested and charged with possession of cocame and destruction of evidence following a 
warrantless sweep search of her home After the search, she was taken to police headquarters The results from the 
search were negative Later, defense counsel and *489 defendant went to defendant's residence and closed the front 
door Moments later police officers heard a toilet flush several tunes Three days later, the officers obtained a search 
warrant for the septic tank connected to the house Forty plastic bags were found dunng the search, twenty of which 
tested positive for cocame residue 
Defense counsel was called as a prosecution witness for the government at a pretrial suppression hearing He objected 
and thereafter entered into a stipulation with the government wherein he stated that he did not use any of the bathrooms 
while he was mside defendant's house The stipulation was introduced into evidence at trial On appeal, die court held 
that defendant's Sixdi Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated because her counsel faced 
potential criminal liability on the same charges for which she was being tried ind because he acted as a prosecution 
witness Id at 136 
The court stated that "when defense counsel has independent personal information regarding the facts underlying his 
client's charges, and faces potential liability for those charges, he has an actual conflict of interest," which may hkeh 
impair his professional judgment Id. In such a situation, a court cannot assume that a lawyer "vigorously pursued his 
client's best interest entirely free from the influence of his own concern to avoid his own incrimination" Id The lawyer 
must either withdraw or be disqualified. Id. 
Similarly, m Hobson* defendant appealed his convictioa of drug trafficking on the ground that a conflict of interest 
between him and his attorney violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel The affidavits of 
two witnesses implicated defendant's attorney as a coconspirator in the transportation of marijuana from Panama to the 
United States The court upheld the district court's disqualification of defense counsel because if the evidence indicating 
defense counsel's involvement in the crime were presented at trial, defense counsel's credibility and integrity would be 
impugned, which would likely be detrimental to defendant Hobson, 672 F 2d at 828-29 
[6] Zepp, Hobson and other conflict of interest cases have also dis^^sH ethical standards under the Rules of 
Professional Conduct [FN2] While violation of the Rules does not "create any presumption that a legal duty has been 
breached" or provide a basis for civil liability, Scope. Utah R.Prof Conduct courts have referred to the Rules to 
augment legal principles involving lawyer conduct The amplication of ethical standards to particular facts is a question 
of law See Hobson. 672 F 2d at 828 Counsel's conduct may be examined m light of prevailing professional and 
Copr © West 1998 No Clanm to Ong U S Govt Works 
823P.2d484 
(Citeas:823P.2d484,M89) 
Page 6 
ethical standards to determine whether defendant received effective representation. Zcpp,748F.2d at 135. 
FN2. The Utah Rules of Professional Conduct replaced the eariier Utah Canons of Professional Responsibility. 
Rule 1.7(b) of die Utah Rules of Professional Conduct states: 
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by... the lawyer's own 
interest unless: (1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected, and (2) Each 
client consents after consultation 
Also, in order to continue representation under Rule 1.7(b), the client's representation must not appear to be adversely 
affected by the lawyer's other interests. Code Comparison, Utah RJProf.Conduct 1.7. The Comment notes to this rule 
explain that where the "probity of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or 
impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice n Comment, Utah ILProf.Conduct 1.7. 
Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d) addresses die institutional interest in ensuring that just verdicts are rendered 
in cnmmal cases-an interest that may be jeopardized by die existence of conflicts of interest Wheat, 108 S.Ct at 1697. 
Courts *490 have an "interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession 
and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them." Id. Rnk 8.4(d) states: "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to .~ engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice* When a lawyer engages in 
irresponsible or improper conduct, the public's confidence in the bar and in the legal process is eroded. Hobson, 672 
F.2d at 828. This is especially true when a lawyer's integrity is impugned before a jury. Id. at 829. 
[7] In Hobson. the court articulated a two-pronged test for determining on appeal whether an attorney should have been 
disqualified from a case because of an appearance of impropriety. Although die test was based upon Canon Nine of the 
former Canons of Professional Responsibility, we find the test appropriate under the current Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct. First, the court must find that there is "at least a reasonable possibility that some specifically identifiable 
impropriety" occurred because of the representation. Id. (quoting Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 
813 (5th Cir.1976)). There need not be proof of actual wrongdoing, however. Id. at 829. Second, the court must 
balance "the likelihood of public suspicion or obloquy11 against the social interest in allowing the defendant to continue 
being represented by the lawyer of his or her choice. Hobson, 672 F.2d at 828 (quoting Woods, 537 F.2d at 813 n. 12). 
"[T]he interest m permitting a cnmmal defendant to retain counsel of his choice is strong and deserves great respect. 
The right to counsel of choice is not absolute, however, and must give way where its vindication would create a serious 
risk of undermining public confidence in die integrity of our legal system." Hobson. 672 F.2d at 828. An attorney 
should be disqualified if both prongs are satisfied. Id. [FN3] 
FN3. It is also apparent that Bottum could have, and perhaps should have, been called as a witness. Utah Rule of Professional 
Conduct 3.7(a) states: 
A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a tnai in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness except where. (1) The 
testimony relates to an uncontested issue; (2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; 
or (3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client 
In applying die foregoing principles to this case, we note that Zepp and Hobson present facts similar to those herein. 
Bottum was implicated as a coconspirator m Adams's testimony and in the prosecutor's closmg argument. He had an 
interest m exonerating himself which was not consistent with defending his client. Also, Bottum's integrity and 
credibility as defense counsel as well as personally, were eroded by the accusations, making him less effective m 
representing defendant. These facts demonstrate an actual conflict of interest between Bottum and defendant. The 
conflict clearly affected Bottum's performance as defense counsel. The effect of the conflict was evident m his 
questioning of Adams, his failure to call defendant as a witness, and his failure to object to comments of the prosecutor 
during closmg argument. Ethical considerations also lead to the conclusion that an actual conflict of interest existed 
between Bottum and defendant and that he ought not to have acted as counsel. He had a personal interest in vindicating 
himself which was not consonant with the interests of his client. Implications that Bottum was a participant m illegal 
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activities not only lessened his effectiveness as counsel for defendant, but also discredited die system under which 
defendant was tned. Because we find that there was an actual conflict of interest between Bottum and defendant and 
that the conflict affected Bottum's performance as counsel, we presume defendant was prejudiced thereby 
Waiver 
[8] Defendant purportedly waived any potential conflict of interest during the pretrial proceeding. Defendant argues 
that his waiver is invalid because, as a matter of law, he is unable to waive such a conflict 
[9] A defendant can generally waive his or her right to conflict-free counsel. Holloway, M91 435 U.S. at 483 n. 5, 98 
S Ct. at 1178 n. 5. To be valid, such a waiver must be knowing and intelligent md made "only after adequate warning 
by the [tnal] court of the potential hazards posed by the conflict of interest and of die accused's right to other counsel" 
Umted States v Rodriguez, 929 F 2d 747, 750 (1st Cir 1991) (per curiam). The validity of a waiver depends upon 
whether die defendant knew enough about die possible consequences to make an mfonncd choice. Umted States v 
Roth, 860 F 2d 1382,1387-88 (7th Cir.1988) cert denied, 490 U.S. 1080,109 S.Ct 2099,104 LJEA2d 661 (1989). 
[10][11] Tnal courts have die discretion to grant a waiver and are not expected to foresee all the possible events which 
may take place during tnal See Roth, 860 F.2d at 1387-89. Tnal courts can refuse to accept a defendant's waiver 
where there is either an actual or a potential conflict of interest between defendant and counsel. Wheat 108 S.Ct at 
1698-99 Tnal courts have an "institutional interest m protecting the truth-seeking function of the proceedings over 
which [they are] presiding by considering whether [defendants have] effective Jissistance of counsel regardless of anv 
proffered waiver[s] " Umted States v Moscony, 927 F.2d 742, 749 (3d Cir.) cert denied, 501 U.S. 1211, 111 S.Ct 
2812, 115 L£d.2d 984 (1991). 
We ore sensitive to the possibility that a defendant may seek a waiver and then try to use it to his or her advantage later. 
vVe do not condone such manipulation. In this case, however, Bottum's denial to the tnal count during the pretrial 
hearing of any knowledge or involvement m die sale of securities was not borne out Bottum said that he had not 
participated in die transactions and could refute any implications with defendant's testimony. At tnal, however, 
prosecution witness Adams was adamant about Bottum's involvement Bottum did not call defendant as a witness and 
therefore neither he nor any other witness was able to rebut this evidence. Defendant was advised during the pretrial 
hearing that Bottum would not be able to act both as counsel and as a witness, but was never told of die possible 
deletenous effects on the jury if his defense counsel were implicated in the same H*»nfoigs constituting criminal activity 
as was he. Therefore, die waiver does not preclude defendant's ineffective assistance claim because it was based on 
representations contrary to what actually happened at tnal and incomplete knowledge of die possible consequences 
When the conduct occurred during trial, defendant was not then fully informed of die possible consequences and did not 
then have an opportunity to make a voluntary and informed waiver. [FN4] Therefore, die waiver was not valid and does 
not preclude defendant's chum of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
FN4 While we do not go so far. Hobaon held a defendant may not waive a conflict cf interest where "the ethical violation involves 
public perception of the lawyer and the legal system rather than some difficulty in the attorney's effective representation...." 672 
FJ2dat829 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because of the ineffectiveness of his counsel resulting 
from an actual conflict of interest. His pretrial waiver of any potential conflict did not extend to what occurred at tnal 
when the actual conflict crystallized. We reverse and remand for a new tnal. 
GARFF and RUSSON, JJ, concur. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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ORME, Presiding Judge: 
Defendant's main contention on appeal is that the trial 
court violated Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e) by failing to inform him, 
before he entered his guilty plea, of the maximum additional 
sentence that could be imposed upon him by reason of the firearm 
enhancement.l 
In State v. Gibbons.
 7 4 0 p.2d 1309, 1312-14 (Utah 1987), our 
Supreme Court held that strict compliance with the constitutional 
and procedural requirements for the taking of a guilty plea was 
required before such a plea could be taken. However, pleas taken 
before Gibbons2 are upheld so long as the record as a whole 
demonstrates "substantial compliance'1 with Rule 11 of the Utah 
1. Although defendant raises additional arguments, they are 
without merit and we decline to address them further. See, e.g.. 
State v. Carter. 776 P.2d 886, 889 (Utah 1989) ("[T]his Court 
need not analyze and address in writing each and every argument, 
issue, or claim raised and properly before us on appeal."). 
2. Gibbons was a clear break with the Supreme Court's rulings in 
previous cases dealing with the validity of guilty pleas and, 
therefore, is not applied retroactively, state v Hoff. 814 P.2d 
1119, 1123 (Utah 1991). 
Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Constitution, w-i llett v. 
Barnes. 842 P.2d 860, 861 (Utah 1992); Sfafp v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 
1119, 1123-24 (Utah 1991). In this case, defendant's plea was 
taken prior to the Supreme Court's opinion in Gibbons and, 
therefore, must be evaluated under the substantial compliance 
test. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e) provides, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of 
guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally 
ill, and may noc accept the plea unci! the 
court has found: 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and 
maximum sentence, and if applicable, the 
minimum mandatory nature of the minimum 
sentence, that may be imposed for each 
offense to which a plea is entered, including 
the possibility of the imposition of 
consecutive sentences . . . . 
During the taking of the plea, the trial court informed defendant 
that a one to five year firearm enhancement was possible in 
addition to the sentence for the underlying aggravated kidnaping 
charge. Defendant then entered his plea of guilty. However, at 
defendant's sentencing, following the receipt of a presentence 
report indicating five prior convictions for armed robbery, the 
court enhanced defendant' s minimum mandatory term of fifteen 
years to life with a consecutive term of five to ten years for 
his use of a firearm.3 Because the trial court failed to inform 
defendant of the maximum sentience that could have been imposed 
upon him by reason of the firearm enhancement, the trial court 
was not in substantial compliance with Utah R. Crim. P. 11 on 
this point. 
Nonetheless, it is not necessary that defendant be allowed 
to withdraw his guilty plea since the problem is limited to the 
3. Of course, at the time the plea was taken, the trial court 
did not know of the additional convictions. Nonetheless, the 
point could have been adequately covered by explaining the 
enhancement scheme to defendant and emphasizing that the 
enhancement to be ultimately imposed would depend on the number 
and nature of his prior convictions, but could be as much as ten 
years. £££ Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(1) (Supp. 1996). 
firearm enhancement. At the invitation of the State, we modify 
defendant's sentence by reducing the firearm, enhancement to that 
which had been explained to him, namely, not less than one year 
nor more than five years. See State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1211 
(Utah 1993) (holding that appellate courts have the authority to 
modify criminal judgments on appeal). The order appealed from is 
otherwise affirmed. 
